

The HISTORICAL BULLETIN

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A CATHOLIC QUARTERLY
for Teachers and Students of History

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Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu

Edward Hagemann, S. J.

Alma College

JUST a little over fifty years ago, in 1894, the *Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu*¹ came into existence. The cooperative work of the Spanish provinces of the Society of Jesus with headquarters in Madrid is the collection of the original texts of the Society with critical and historical apparatus, introduction, and index. The texts were found all over Europe, not only in the archives of the Society but often in public libraries and in state and city archives. At first the documents were published in fascicles every month, but later on volumes were published as they were completed. At any given time there were never many fathers on the staff: at present there are not more than half a dozen.

In 1929 the work was transferred from Madrid to Rome. There, non-Spanish fathers joined the staff, which was put under the direction of Father Pedro Leturia, and the expenses were thenceforth met by the whole Society. While sixty-one volumes were published in Madrid, only four so far have been published in Rome. The scope of the collection is now being enlarged. With the exception of the *Monumenta Xaveriana* the volumes so far published have contained only documents written in Europe. Now the work is to embrace the missions. The documents of the missions in Portuguese India, Peru, and Florida have already been partially prepared for publication, and a vice-director of this missionary section has been appointed in Father Felix Zubillaga, already known for his work on Florida.² The editors of the *Monumenta* live in the Historical Institute³ of the Society together with other Jesuit writers of history. The Institute publishes *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu*, a review appear-

ing biannually that treats questions of Jesuit history.

As the Society of Jesus played such a prominent part in the history of the Counter Reformation, it may well be concluded how important to historians of that period is the publication of the original documents. Pastor calls the *Monumenta* "great" and "authoritative."⁴ The statements of other historians may be found in Rodeles.⁵ Without the *Monumenta* the great histories of the Assistancies of the Society⁶ would have been impossible. A cursory glance at the documentation of these works will show how indebted they are to the *Monumenta* for their treatment of the early periods of their histories. Also a great number of the historical works published in the last twenty years on individual Jesuits and Jesuit enterprises is based on the *Monumenta*, which Paul Dudon, S. J., calls "mine extraordinairement riche des informations les plus précieuses."⁷

The *Monumenta* so far published may be divided into three different classes: (1) documents of St. Ignatius and his first companions, (2) documents of other members of the early Society, (3) a few other documents of the early period of the Society.

Of the documents dealing with St. Ignatius himself we have four series. The first⁸ comprises extant letters and instructions written by the Saint. Ignatius was a great letter writer. A proof is found here in the close onto seven thousand letters written either by him or by his secretary. These letters were written to Jesuits and to many people outside the Society of different social classes. The instructions were those he gave to his subjects when sending them to found new colleges or to carry out missions entrusted to them by the Holy Father or for other important works. The contents are a rich mine for learning the spirit of Ignatius, and of the Society. The second series⁹ provides a critical study of the text of the Spiritual Exercises preceded by a valuable discussion of the sources. The third series¹⁰ is a critical edition of the text of the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus written by Ignatius. The fourth series¹¹ contains writings of others concerning

¹ Cecilio Gómez Rodeles, S. J., *Historia de la Publicacion, Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu* (Madrid, 1913). This gives the best account of the history of the work. It is translated in part in "Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu," *Woodstock Letters* (Woodstock Seminary), XLIV (1915), 297-311. Thomas Hughes, S. J., "Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu," *Woodstock Letters* (Woodstock), XLIII (1914), 293-298. Anton Huonder, S. J., "Die Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu oder die ältesten Geschichtsquellen des Jesuitenordens," *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach* (Freiburg im Breisgau), LXXXVII (1914), 470-492. This gives best analysis of work. Art. "Monumenta Historica Soc. Jesu," in Ludwig Koch, S. J., *Jesuiten-Lexicon* (Paderborn, 1934), cols. 1235-1236. Dionisio Fernandez Zapico, S. J. and Pedro Leturia, S. J., "Cincuentenario de Monumenta Historica S. I. 1894-1944," *Archivum Historicum Societatis Jesu*, XIII (1944), 1-61.

² *La Florida, la Misión Jesuítica (1566-1577) y la Colonización Española* (Rome, 1941).

³ For further details see Edmond Lamalle, S. J., "L'Activité de l'Institut Historique S. I.," *Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu* (Rome), VII (1938), 173-80; cited hereafter as A. H. S. I.

⁴ *History of the Popes*, XII, 1, note 1. For examples of the good use Pastor makes of the *Monumenta* see XII, 1-123; XIII, 178-208, 307-23; XIV, 247-58; XVI, 88-97.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 51-57.

⁶ A brief description of these is given in Gilbert J. Garraghan, S. J., "The Jesuit Quadricentennial, 1940," *Catholic Historical Review* (Washington), XXVI (1940), 299-300.

⁷ *Saint Ignace de Loyola* (Paris, 1934), viii.

⁸ *Epistolae et Instructiones* (12 vols., Madrid, 1903-11).

⁹ *Exercitia Spiritualia et eorum Directoria* (Madrid, 1919).

¹⁰ *Constitutiones* (3 vols., Rome, 1934-38).

¹¹ *Scripta de S. Ignatio* (2 vols., Madrid, 1904-18).

Ignatius. Of prime importance for an intimate knowledge of Ignatius are the "Autobiography" dictated by Ignatius shortly before his death to Luis Gonçalves da Câmara, and the "Memorial" of the same da Câmara giving information he had acquired from Ignatius.

Francis Xavier receives two volumes.¹² The first contains an account of the history of the missions by Father Valignani, the Visitor to the Far East and, after Xavier, the greatest organizer of the Jesuit missions in Asia.¹³ The greater, and by far the more important part of the volume is taken up by the letters and documents of Xavier. The former, one hundred and thirty-eight in number, carry Xavier from 1535, when he wrote from Paris to his brother praising Ignatius, to 1552, just a few weeks before his death on Sancian. Among the twenty-nine other documents are several instructions on methods in mission work. The whole forms an indispensable source for understanding the history of the missions in the Far East and of Portuguese expansion in Asia. These letters will be republished in their proper chronological place in the series dealing with the missions in the Orient. This new edition will profit by the research work of Georg Schurhammer in the field of Xaveriana. Schurhammer has discovered that certain letters in the first volume of the *Monumenta* are falsifications.¹⁴ Moreover, he has found some better texts¹⁵ and has unearthed two hitherto unknown letters.¹⁶ The second volume contains mainly documents connected with the process of Xavier's beatification.

James Laynez succeeded Ignatius as General of the Society. He had been closely associated with Ignatius from the early days in Paris, and had accompanied him in his wanderings. Later while Ignatius remained in Rome, Laynez moved much around Europe. As papal theologian he took a leading part in the Council of Trent, and as theological adviser to Cardinal Hippolyte d'Este spoke at the Conference of Poissy. His activity largely coincided with the Counter Reformation. His volumes in the *Monumenta*¹⁷ contain the letters written by him to Jesuits all over Europe and in India, his letters to non-Jesuits, clergy and nobles, and the letters addressed to him by fellow Jesuits and others. His letters treat of such diverse subjects as the work against heretics, advice to superiors on governing their subjects gently, instructions how to deal with cardinals and princes, the accounts of his journeys through France and Germany, and his dealings with the bishops in the Council of Trent.

Blessed Peter Faber, companion of Ignatius at Paris

¹² *Monumenta Xaveriana* (2 vols., Madrid, 1899-1912).

¹³ Only the first part, to the death of Xavier, 1552, is here published. The second part, to 1564, was discovered only quite recently. Joseph Wicki, S. J., "Der Zweite Teil der Historia Indica Valignani's," A. H. S. I., VII (1938), 275-85.

¹⁴ Georg Schurhammer, S. J., *Die Zeitgenössischen Quellen zur Geschichte Portugiesisch-Asiens und seiner Nachbarländer zur Zeit des hl. Franz Xavier* (Leipzig, 1932), nn. 1123, 4028, 4095, 4721. For other falsified letters see Schurhammer, *Cartas Falsificadas de Sao Francisco Xavier* (Coimbra, 1931).

¹⁵ *Id.*, "Der 'Grosse Brief' des Heiligen Franz Xavier," *Commemoration Volume of the Science of Religion in Tokyo Imperial University* (Tokyo, 1934), pp. 178-219.

¹⁶ *Id.*, "Zwei ungedruckte Briefe des hl. Franz Xavier," A. H. S. I., II (1933), 44-55.

¹⁷ *Lainii Monumenta* (8 vols., Madrid, 1912-17).

and the only priest of the original group, had said the Mass at their taking of the vows at Montmartre, 1534. His chief work was preaching, hearing confessions, and giving retreats. By these latter he inspired many clerics and laymen with enthusiasm and courage for the Catholic cause. The first Jesuit in Germany, he had founded the first Jesuit community in Cologne. In this city he strengthened the Catholics against the Protestant tendencies of Archbishop Herman von Wied. His volume of the *Monumenta*¹⁸ contains letters and instructions dealing largely with his efforts to help the Catholic work against the heretics, the "Memoriale", a precious document revealing his inner life from early years to the year of his death, 1546, and documents for the process of his beatification.

Alphonso Salmeron went with Laynez to study theology at Paris, where he met Ignatius. Later he accompanied Laynez as papal theologian to the Council of Trent. He lectured at Ingolstadt and later worked in Poland and Belgium. In two volumes of the *Monumenta*¹⁹ the letters written by and to him are published. As he was the provincial of the Naples Province of the Society from 1558 to 1576, a large part of his correspondence deals with the direction of this province.

The next volume²⁰ contains the letters and documents of four Jesuits who were companions of Ignatius in Paris. Paschase Broët did much apostolic work in Italy and was sent with Salmeron by Paul III to Ireland in 1541 to strengthen the Catholics in their faith. Later he became provincial of the Jesuits in France, where he founded colleges and labored much for the good of the faith. The volume opens with the report sent by Broët to Cardinal Cervini of his mission to Ireland. The second of the four, Claude Le Jay, worked much in Germany. He was called to take part in the Council of Trent, gave lectures at the University in Vienna, and did ministerial work. Several of his letters give interesting side lights on the Council at Trent. Jean Codure had been chosen with Salmeron for the papal mission to Ireland, but his early death prevented him from going. Of the thirteen documents under his name, seven deal with the preparations for the Irish mission. The last of the four, Simon Rodriguez, was the first provincial in Portugal, where the Society was flourishing under the protection of John III. His letters, numbering one hundred and thirteen, deal mainly with the affairs of the province he governed. These are followed by a number of rules he wrote for the scholastics at Coimbra and a precious document important for the early history of the Society, "De Origine et Progressu Societatis Jesu".

Nicholas Bobadilla was also one of the first companions of Ignatius. His letters²¹ describe his apostolic activity in Italy, his work as military chaplain in the imperial army especially during the Schmalkaldic War, the part he took in the Diets of Nuremberg, Spire, and Regensburg, and his apostolic work later in Dalmatia.

(Please turn to page sixty-four)

¹⁸ *Fabri Monumenta* (Madrid, 1914).

¹⁹ *Epistolae P. Alphonsi Salmeronis* (2 vols., Madrid, 1906-07).

²⁰ *Epistolae PP. Paschasii Broeti, Claudii Jaji, Joannis Codurii et Simonis Rodericii* (Madrid, 1903).

²¹ *Bobadillae Monumenta* (Madrid, 1913).

The Aerarium and Roman Expansion

James F. Hanley, S. J.

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EVER since the Atlantic Charter pointed to world-wide economic development as a United Nations war aim¹ there has been a steady insistence that adequate methods for promoting rehabilitation of trade and industry should be provided for in settling the present conflict. Thus, in 1943, two years after the Atlantic Charter, the United States Secretary of State declared for a post-war system "of financial relations so devised that materials can be produced and ways may be found of moving them where there are markets created by human need."² The most recent development along these lines came with the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July, 1944. The proposals made there for monetary stabilization excited wide comment, but the outline of a World Bank, the purpose of which would be "to assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes,"³ has received scant attention. Yet, in the opinion of some,⁴ adequate and efficient loan activities could well be the means to currency stabilization through capital improvement and restoration. In the last analysis world economic stability is a problem of bringing the standard of living and buying power of the backward areas into line with the productive talents of the advanced centers.⁵ A technique capable of effecting such a result is a primary requisite for world order, and the Bretton Woods conference hoped to establish such a technique by forming a World Bank. Such a bank would be able to gather deposits from all parts of the world, especially from the richer countries, and it would use these deposits for loans to productive enterprises in undeveloped and deteriorated parts of the world economy.⁶ The plan of action outlined at Bretton Woods⁷ takes two outstanding facts of world economic organization into account: first, it is almost impossible to maintain high productivity in nations such as the United States without some foreign markets; second, there will be no foreign market unless there is productive ability as a basis of buying power in foreign lands. The Bretton Woods conference envisaged a world of thriving commerce based on opportunities for all nations to develop their productive abilities, thus eliminating that lack of purchasing power, which is the central problem of world trade. In this

respect the current situation is basically similar to the problem of trade faced by the early Roman Emperors.

The Roman Economy in 30 B.C.

The complete mastery of the Roman World by Augustus was the culmination of a long series of efforts by military men to secure supreme power. Beginning with Sulla in 88 B.C. the Mediterranean was a theater of civil war, the scene of armed conflict that waxed and waned, then grew to white heat for nineteen years until, finally, with the first of the Roman Emperors the Pax Romana began. During this long period of unrest hardly a corner of the civilized world escaped the ravishment of war. Large armies, capably commanded, engaged in major battles and extensive blockades that shackled the productive talents of artisan and agrarian alike, decimated the civilian population of large centers, and gave rise to political and economic stagnation. In the provinces, both of the East and of the West, civilization was at a low ebb, for the provinces were the scene of the greatest battles and they suffered most from the wars.⁸ The central government, of course, was in a deteriorated condition, the treasury being so exhausted that Augustus was forced to expend his loot of Ptolemy gold in order to pay his armies and begin the imperial organization.⁹ The historian is not wont to dwell upon the details of this extensive ruin because later developments showed the magnificent potentialities of the suffering territories. But to the observer of that day the situation gave grounds for no small amount of pessimism. Italy, it is true, stood up well under the shock of war, her arts and crafts remaining on a high plane, her economic institutions robust. The provinces were the seat of chaos; they bore the cost of war, and their condition was a cause of prime concern to the new rulers.¹⁰

The eastern provinces had a glorious past based on Greek culture and the efficient, highly organized form of economic structure known as Hellenistic Capitalism. This system was characterized by a strong municipal organization in which the middle class was given unrestricted opportunity for commercial and industrial development.¹¹ By 30 B.C., however, this condition has ceased. The causes of the decline are multiple, but wars and political domination by extortionary tyrants were leading factors.¹² At the high stages of their earlier development the productive facilities of Asia Minor and Syria were not only capable of providing goods for local needs, but they also supported a large intersectional trade. At a later date, however, the Mithradatic wars and the tendency of Roman provincial governors made

¹ United States Department of State, *War Documents* (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1944) 1.

² Walter Lippmann, *U. S. War Aims* (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1944) 230.

³ United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, *Articles of Agreement* (Washington; U. S. Treasury Department, 1944) 51.

⁴ B. M. Anderson, "Postwar Stabilization of Foreign Exchange" *The Economic Bulletin* IV (May, 1943) 35.

⁵ Adolph Lowe, "The Trend in World Economics" *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* III (April, 1944) 421.

⁶ United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-61.

⁷ Consideration is had here only of those parts of the *Articles of Agreement* that deal with a World Bank.

⁸ M. Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire* (London; The Oxford University Press, 1926) 34.

⁹ M. Cary, *A History of Rome* (London; Macmillan and Co., 1935) 446.

¹⁰ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 30.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹² Cary, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-333.

it impossible for these centers to continue in their traditional role as the chief industrial plant and commercial leaders of the Mediterranean.¹³ This district remained an important *entrepot* for Indian and Chinese goods until a late date in the Republic period, but the Roman civil wars conditioned a rise in piracy which, together with a more active operation of the Parthian road-block brought about a decline in this last remaining supremacy.

The situation in the West was somewhat different. If we except Italy and Africa, it is possible to compare the western provinces at the beginning of the Empire with undeveloped sections of the modern world like India or China. Gaul had been in contact with the Greek and Roman economies from the sixth century, B.C.; but, though she became a positive unit of Roman provincial organization after the campaigns of Julius Caesar, her rich fields and substantial mineral supply were practically untouched at the time of the early Augustan period.¹⁴ Spain and the borders of the Danube and Rhine were also lacking in the essentials of higher economic organization; the rude household economies that obtained there were incapable of developing the resources at hand. Spain, like Africa, had once enjoyed the fruits of thorough urbanization; but under the provincial policy of the later Republic, it lapsed from the stability inherited from Greek influence and Carthaginian rule. Her mineral output was considerable, however, as proved from the experience of a later growth, it was limited by lack of political and capital organization.¹⁵ The Danubian marches, Germany, and Britain had hardly tasted true Romanization at this period. The cities that were to appear along the Danube and Rhine and in Britain had not arisen; and since agricultural as well as industrial output were alike dependent upon municipal forms, the rise of these areas in trade participation was delayed until a later period.

A proper concept of the economic problem of the early Empire demands an appreciation of the decay in the East and the low stage of organization in the West. It also calls for an appreciation of the places of Italy, Africa, and Egypt in the general scheme of things. While Italy suffered to some extent from the civil wars, it was not subject to the drain on resources or want of organic solidity that was the lot of the provinces. The Italian peninsula remained the center of economic life in the Roman world. For, although Italy was a large consumer of imported goods, she was able, by virtue of a vigorous agricultural and industrial plant, to supply an export trade that balanced the substantial inward flow.¹⁶ As contrasted with the healthy individual enterprise of Italy, the internal economic structures of Africa and Egypt presented spectacles of outright exploitation. Expansive estates, worked almost exclusively by slave labor, were the rule in the former province;¹⁷ the latter was still in the throes of an exploitation wrought by one

of the most severe forms of State Socialism in history.¹⁸ Whatever the social implications of these conditions, it is certain that productivity was high, for African grain and Egyptian manufactures were found in all the civilized centers, especially in Rome. It was the problem of Roman rehabilitation and recovery programs after 30 B.C. to coordinate recovery and development in the eastern and western provinces with the existing activities of Italy, Egypt, and Africa. This was a task that involved economic policy on a world-wide basis.

The Problem

The difficulties involved in this matter were a good deal like the current problems of world trade and exchange. The problem was, to shift funds from one area to another so that an optimum distribution of the facilities for the creation of useful goods would ensue. In other words, a capital gain in one province might afford a better means to prosperity if it were spent in some remote place than if it were used at home. Of course, when local needs do not require the full expenditure of past profits, there is no difficulty about shifting their investment to other areas, especially when such a shift results in profit-sharing by the region which exports the funds. English participation in the spread of the Industrial Revolution during the late nineteenth century is a good example of capital shift under this type of motivation. The tremendous capital surplus of the United States in the years after World War I found its way to all parts of the globe simply because investment abroad yielded higher returns than home expenditure for capitalization purposes.

However, when the capital structure of a nation has been impaired, when surplus funds are not plentiful, and when the opportunities for investment at home yield high profits, then it is most difficult to secure a transfer of funds from the more advanced to the undeveloped regions for purposes of development. It is likely that such a situation will obtain after the cessation of the present war, and it is with this prospect in view that the Bretton Woods Conference sought a method of providing against a deficiency of funds for expansion and rehabilitation. A nation such as the United States, which has appropriated 375 billion dollars for war purposes since 1940,¹⁹ will have no large sums of private capital when the peace comes. Neither will the United Kingdom, a nation whose position as the great creditor in the early days of the present century has been changed to such an extent that at the present time, as the result of wholesale disinvestment and borrowing procedures, it is in considerable debt.²⁰ The results of war, even in our modern credit economy, are such that they present serious obstacles to capital transfer and, hence, to world development. But the interdependence existing among all parts of the world economy makes capital immobility a matter for international concern, because, even though

(Please turn to page sixty-five)

¹³ F. Oertel, "The Economic Unification of the Mediterranean Region" *The Cambridge Ancient History*, S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, M. P. Charlesworth, eds. (London; Cambridge University Press, 1934) 383.

¹⁴ F. Oertel, *op. cit.*, 404.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 405.

¹⁶ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 33.

¹⁷ James Westfall Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages* (New York; Century Co., 1928) 6.

¹⁸ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 256.

¹⁹ Seventy-eighth Congress of the United States, *Congressional Record* XC, 119 (Washington; Government Printing Office, July 7, 1944) A3744.

²⁰ British Information Services, *Fifty Facts About Britain's War Effort* (New York; British Information Services, November, 1944) 17.

The American Revolution: Subject for Study

Charles H. Metzger, S. J.

West Baden College

IF it is rational to assume that everyone should be interested in his country's history, the assumption seems even more reasonable in the case of a citizen of a democratic state. Such a one should be well informed about the origin of his country, and the men and events which gave it independence and made it a member of the brotherhood of nations. It would be preposterous to assert that there is no such interest in our early history. In part this interest is due to the establishment and activities of historical associations and libraries, and still more, perhaps, to anniversaries such as the Washington bicentennial which aroused curiosity about the man and his times.

But it cannot be denied that, by and large, the American people are woefully lacking in exact knowledge, and there is reason to fear that too many of them are satisfied with superficial information, as well as with legends and half-truths that parade as truth. For a long time the teachers of history in colleges and universities, judging by their students and by contacts outside the class room, were fully aware of the situation; but to the public the reality was unknown or glossed over until the inquiry of the New York Times revealed how appalling was the ignorance of the youth of America of their country's history, and to what an alarming extent instruction in the subject had been neglected altogether or imparted in a manner at once unsatisfactory and misleading. Indignation flared at the revelation, and to remedy the abuse and to terminate this threat to national well-being a host of panaceas was suggested, and some were applied.

Another compelling reason for acquiring a thorough knowledge of our country's history, especially of its birth and infancy, is the debunking mania that seized upon popular writers and some historians a score of years ago. In itself it was a healthy reaction to the senseless adulation, the unwarranted assumptions and generalizations, and the blinking of unpleasant facts that had characterized so many historians of previous generations; but that school, if so it may be styled, erred as badly in going to the opposite extreme, to present a picture no less distorted and out of focus. Like vultures they sought only carrion; to belittle and discredit was their aim. Their little minds viewed everyone and everything with jaundiced eyes, found nothing to praise, but much to ridicule. To them John Hancock was only a smuggler, and Sam Adams nothing but a low class propagandist; not even Franklin and Washington were respectable. The enemy on the contrary was noble and worthy of admiration and eulogy; by implication all virtue was to be found in his ranks. This form of aberration is no longer in vogue, but the books produced while that craze was in fashion remain on the shelves of our libraries to ensnare the ignorant and unwary, and fill their minds with misrepresentation.

Very soon an even more insidious attack on the men

and women of the revolutionary generation was launched by novelists. Since it was now fashionable to secure color and background by doing research in the period they were to picture, these writers conformed to the fashion and thus they achieved a semblance of scholarship. But since it is the privilege of the novelists to subordinate events to fit the plot—one suspects a more sinister design however—they stressed certain facts while they ignored others, so that if the result might be good literature, it was not history but caricature. Their presentation of the period is on a par with the characterization of a man which plays up his foibles and highlights his shortcomings but says nothing about his good qualities or redeeming characteristics. It may be true that in some of these novels every incident depicted is a fact of history, but silence in regard to other pertinent facts, opprobrious epithets, interpretation and innuendo, distorted the perspective, did grave injustice to men and brought forth a monstrosity. So general was this trend in novels a few years hence that one has reason to suspect that a guiding hand engineered a campaign to discredit the men associated with the birth of our republic, with a view to demonstrating that the movement for independence was at least a regrettable mistake, perhaps even a discreditable movement carried through by worthless rogues. Be that as it may, the general reader, deceived by the show of scholarship and the plausibility of the narrative, accepted these novels as an accurate portrayal of men and events.

Failure to distinguish between literature and history accounts for this facile misleading of people. Against the tendency to accept as history any composition that portrays historical characters or events the historian must campaign, but the warfare is unceasing, uphill and disheartening. For since the intellectual standards of the majority are not high, and their intellectual inertia is great, they are readily content to 'know much that ain't so' and are slow to give up their beliefs even when they are shown to be error.

Every true scholar aims at impartiality and objectivity in historical writing. However, when current or somewhat recent events are studied, objectivity may be difficult, perhaps impossible of attainment, because after all the historian, whether student, teacher or writer, is no mere automaton or mummy, but a human person with prejudices and preferences, in short a being subject to human emotions. So true is this that it has been maintained that no one is qualified to write or teach the history made in his lifetime for the simple reason that consciously or unconsciously his feelings influence and vitiate his judgment. An unemotional approach to the American Revolution should be possible, even easy, as the issues involved were settled long ago, and the movement is now seen in proper perspective, so that the 'Boston Massacre', to cite but one instance, can be evaluated correctly. Very occasionally, it is true, one

still comes across a writer, such as the Canadian of violent Tory convictions, who made his volume a vehicle for unrestrained denunciation of revolutionary men and times, and indulged in the pastime of calling names to such a degree that he sacrificed all claim to scholarship, or to be taken seriously. Such tactics, be it remarked in passing, are sheer folly in as much as they defeat the very purpose the author supposedly had in mind. Fortunately such pseudo-scholars are few and their audience is small.

Moreover, in appraising the leaders in the War for Independence there is no need for false patriotism or blindness to realities. We admit that all of them were plain human beings with obvious limitations, and not the demi-gods or paragons that the school of Weems and Sparks would have us believe. But the acid test of the passing of time has proved them not unworthy of our gratitude, and in some instances of our admiration. Since, as Tom Paine observed, these were the times that tried men's souls, weaklings and knaves were revealed as always happens when large numbers are subjected to a fiery ordeal. But are such to be regarded as characteristic or the exception? And while it is true, as James Otis remarked, that 'when the pot boils the scum will rise', it is no less true that the scum was skimmed off in short order, and the respectable element gained control with surprising celerity. The scholar need not be a debunker nor a blind eulogist; without undue difficulty he can maintain an even keel and sail safely between Scylla and Charybdis.

An inestimable advantage enjoyed by the student of the Revolution is the wealth of records and remains that are not only extant but accessible as well. In some fields of European history he is apt to find that, unless he can travel in Europe, his opportunities are limited; in some fields of United States history he discovers that whole collections of personal papers, necessary for his study, are in the possession of relatives, who either refuse to allow their examination, or place so many restrictions on their use that his liberty is hampered; in still other cases these papers have been lodged for safe-keeping with an institution, with the proviso that they be withheld from investigators till a certain remote date. Some Lincoln papers are still so impounded. At times governments too adopt the same policy with regard to official papers. Generally speaking, however, this is no longer the case with regard to the public or private papers pertaining to the War for Independence. Time was, however, when such records were so scattered that the scholar had to sacrifice time and money in an effort to locate them; but, during the last half century and more, collectors have been tireless, and their industry has assembled large quantities of correspondence, documents, newspapers, broadsides, books, pamphlets, speeches, sermons, and records of every type, in places easy of access. Nowadays the student, starting with information gleaned from Evan's or Sabin's bibliographies, and armed with knowledge gained from collections of the writings of the chief participants of the Revolution, or from the records of the Continental Congress or the provincial assemblies, and aided by efficient library staffs, finds that his path is not only made easy but its travelling a delightful experience.

Pioneers in gathering and cataloguing material invaluable to scholars were the historical societies of the original states, particularly those of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia, each of which, while it did not neglect the general aspects of the subject, stressed the role of its particular community. In addition the New York Public Library and the American Antiquarian Society in Worcester, and more recently the Newberry Library, were no less active and successful in their quest for records of every kind, while in the Library of Congress treasures beyond computation have been assembled. One depository supplements the other; what one lacks another possesses. One is rich in newspapers, another in correspondence, still another in books and pamphlets.

No satisfactory study of the American Revolution is possible without a sojourn in the William L. Clements Library in Ann Arbor, fruit of the munificence of the man whose name it perpetuates. A unit of the University of Michigan Libraries, this one is unique among American libraries in as much as its policy is, and has been, to concentrate on the American Revolution, without duplicating the efforts of others. In the conviction that no just appraisal of a controversy is possible without the sifting and weighing of the arguments and evidence of both sides, the Clements library directors' special interest has ever been books and pamphlets of British imprint, and the papers of British civil and military officials. The acquisition of these would enable the scholar to compare and contrast, and arrive at well-founded conclusions. Since it was known that in eighteenth century England it was customary for officials, when retiring from office, to appropriate the papers accumulated during their tenure, and as it was also known that many of these collections were in the hands of heirs, the latter were approached, as England was combed for these treasures.

At great outlay the treasures in the Clements Library were brought together, and the process still continues. Here the scholar is literally bewildered by the profusion of good things set before him, as a partial enumeration of the collections will show. Besides a vast number of books and maps there are two folio manuscript volumes of colonial secretary Dartmouth, and eight thousand papers of George Germaine written while he held the same position; six hundred and fifty-two papers of William Knox the colonial under-secretary, and one hundred and forty-four of attorney general Wedderburn; five folios of David Hartley, British peace commissioner; four hundred papers of Sir John Vaughan, British commander in chief in the West Indies, and a collection of four hundred and twenty documents, forty-one diaries and thousands of letters of Hessian and other German mercenaries serving under the British flag.

Invaluable to scholars as are these several collections, they are but minor when compared with the larger and more costly Shelburne, Gage and Clinton papers. For in the Shelburne papers there are fifty thousand documents of official character and one hundred and thirty-six private letters, and in the papers of General Gage, British commander in chief from 1763 to 1775, there are forty thousand documents, while

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Pioneer Social Catholics

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AT the dawn of nineteen hundred and forty-six, a world wearied by six years of global strife, somewhat the wiser for its experience of suffering and social injustice from Adam to the atomic bomb, yet with a measure of hope (the perennial endowment of its young generation), lifted its skirts and set foot into a strange land. The year just gone gave clear signs that the new year might indeed mark the opening of a new era. Among these signs were: the completion of World War II, the development and first use of atomic energy, and the institution of a United Nations Organization. To American Catholics the last days of the old year brought an additional sign in the reorganization of the College of Cardinals of the Roman Church. With an eye to these events it may be well to recall the beginnings of a movement which has played an important role in American life during the past several decades, and that bids for a more dominant position in the new era. This is the Social Catholic movement in the United States.

To discover the sources, and at the same time to realize the vitality, of the Social Catholic movement, one must consider the state of the Catholic Church in America prior to the formal beginnings of the movement. For Catholicism, the United States was still a mission country up to the turn of the present century. The last decade of the nineteenth century may be said to have witnessed the "growing pains" of the adult institution we now know. These "pains" may be clearly discerned in the struggle which divided the American hierarchy on a variety of issues.

In the controversies that raged within the American ecclesiastical circles during the nineties, certain connecting threads are easily perceived. Temptation confronts one to oversimplify the scene by making convenient and exclusive divisions into "Progressives and Reactionaries" or "Radicals and Conservatives", as one's sympathies or prejudices incline. In the face of fuller evidence, however, this cannot be done. As has recently been pointed out, "the leaders in this notable controversy were nearly all capable, zealous men and victory or defeat on one side or the other need not imply in either group any moral delinquency or pastoral defect."¹ Moreover, though certain members of the hierarchy were often drawn up on the same side of the line in different battles, the alliance was not constant. Attention has naturally been focused on the actions of a few vigorous personalities, but in most issues the average bishop had sympathy for both sides, while refraining from active participation in the controversy.

If a "progressive" group among the bishops might be

spoken of, its leaders would properly be Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, and Cardinal James Gibbons of Baltimore. In the history of Social Catholicism the spirit and influence of these two men were to extend down to the present day. On the other side might be listed, at least in some instances, such men as Archbishop Michael Corrigan of New York, Bishop Bernard McQuaid of Rochester, and several of the leading German bishops of the mid-West.

Between these men the bone of contention took various forms; at one time it was the Knights of Labor, whose papal condemnation was sought; again, it was the organization and support of the Catholic parochial school system; for a time, also, there was strong feeling over the efforts of national groups to establish a national clergy; and a final issue was that of Dr. Edward McGlynn's action in supporting the Henry George single-tax reform, against the wishes of his ecclesiastical superior. By the prompt action of Cardinal Gibbons, and with the aid of Cardinal Manning, the proposed condemnation of the Knights, as a secret society, was averted.² The school issue was somewhat settled by the papal rescript of *tolerari potest* in answer to a question on the legitimacy of a plan for state support inaugurated by Archbishop Ireland, and by the announcement of Archbishop Satolli. However, these answers were somewhat modified by later events.³ Cahensleyism, and associated disagreement among the bishops, were overcome by the vigilance of Gibbons, Ireland, and other leaders of Americanization.⁴ Dr. McGlynn's struggle with Archbishop Corrigan, who was strongly supported in his policy by Bishop McQuaid, met defeat in his suspension by the archbishop. On the other hand, Cardinal Gibbons, again with the aid of Cardinal Manning, prevented the condemnation of Henry George's doctrine. This action has come to be recognized as a far-sighted move that did much to save the laboring class for the Church in America.⁵ In the light

² Allen Sinclair Will, *Life of Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop of Baltimore*, 2 vols. (New York, 1922), I, pp. 320-360. T. V. Powderly, *The Path I Trod*, (New York, 1940), pp. 49-53, 347-348. Frederick J. Zwierlein, *The Life and Letters of Bishop McQuaid*, 3 vols. (Rome and Louvain, 1925-1927), II, pp. 437-461. The Knights had previously been condemned by the Archbishop of Quebec, who opposed Gibbons' suit in Rome.

³ Zwierlein, *McQuaid*, III, pp. 160-198. Daniel F. Reilly, *The School Controversy (1891-1893)*, (Washington, 1943). It has been pointed out that this book sometimes give more authority to Ireland's position than the documents allow. Moreover, there is little consideration made in it of important subsequent statements from the Holy See, such as the encyclical letter *Divini Illius Magistri*, issued in 1929.

⁴ Will, *Gibbons*, II, p. 523. Zwierlein, *McQuaid*, II, pp. 378-437. Reilly, *School Controversy*, pp. 57-64.

⁵ Zwierlein, *McQuaid*, III, pp. 1-83. Will, *Gibbons*, I, pp. 361-378. John A. Ryan, *Social Doctrine in Action*, (New York, 1941), p. 41. Several of the issues here touched upon have been briefly, though objectively, reviewed in the recent *History of the Archdiocese of Boston, 1604-1943*, by Robert H. Lord, John Sexton, and Edward T. Harrington, (New York, 1944), 3 vols., in the first section of the third volume. The incumbent of Boston at the time was Archbishop John J. Williams, a moderate, in contact with both sides in the question.

¹ Thomas T. McAvoy, "Americanism, Fact and Fiction," *The Catholic Historical Review*, XXXI (July, 1945), p. 134. Theodore Maynard has remarked, for example, on the generosity of Bishop McQuaid, despite his ferocity and occasionally unscrupulous methods. *The Story of American Catholicism* (New York, 1941), see p. 491.

of this struggle for and against a rapid Americanization of Catholic ways, and of an increased interest in social problems, the publication of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter, *Rerum Novarum*, in 1891, takes on a special significance.

"The pronouncements of Leo . . . were far from being isolated outbursts of a peculiarly voluble pontiff whose sense of social decency came as a shock to an apathetic hierarchy."⁶ Two years before *Rerum Novarum*, speaking at the first American Catholic Congress, met in Baltimore, November 11 and 12, 1889, Archbishop Ireland had assured the assembled lay delegates that there was dawning a new era in the American Church and that the bishops would lead them in the work of Catholic action. Again, on October 18, 1893, he sounded the challenge to a crusade for social justice.

It is an age of battlings for social justice to all men. . . . We have, of late, been so accustomed to lock up our teachings in seminary and sanctuary that when they appear in active evolution in the broad arena of life they are not recognized by Catholics; nay, are even feared and disowned by them.⁷

The seed of this word was destined to fall on fertile ground. John A. Ryan, at the time a student in the St. Paul diocesan seminary, acknowledged that from it he derived information, inspiration, and encouragement. Looking back over the role Dr. Ryan was to play in Social Catholicism in the United States, it is not too much to say that this marks a definite forward motion for the movement. To John Ryan credit must be given, if it may be given to any one man, as a chief agitator and one of the foremost leaders of the whole movement from its inception, down to his death in the fall of nineteen hundred and forty-five.

With the venerable St. Louis Jesuit, the Rev. Dr. Joseph Husslein, encouraged and protected by a few far-seeing members of the American Catholic Hierarchy, although both of them were denounced by some fellow Catholics as "radicals" and later "Bolsheviks," he succeeded in converting the majority of Catholics from a provincial American conservatism on social questions to a progressive attitude that prepared the way for acceptance here of the advanced proposals adopted by the modern Popes in their social Encyclicals.⁸

As noted, Ryan was soon joined by a small band of Catholics who responded to the felt social necessities of the time. Notable among these were several who wrote for the national Catholic weekly, *America*. In 1912, Joseph Husslein, S. J., published a collection of essays explanatory of Christian principles on labor, property, and other social questions. In this work he sounded once more the call to united Catholic social action.

Here is clearly the first and indispensable condition for success. The laborer and the poor must feel that our house is open to them, our heart is warm for them, our sympathy is eagerly enlisted in their cause.⁹

⁶ Emmett John Hughes, *The Church and the Liberal Society*, (Princeton, 1944), p. 215. On the other hand, as Pius XI wrote in *Quadragesimo Anno*: "(this teaching) quite novel to worldly ears, was looked upon with suspicion by some, even among Catholics, and gave offense to others."

⁷ John Ireland, *The Church and Modern Society*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1896; St. Paul, 1904), I, pp. 100-101.

⁸ New York Times, September 17, 1945. Obituary notice on death of Ryan.

⁹ Joseph Husslein, *The Church and Social Problems*, (New York, 1912), p. 207. It is significant that this book contains an essay on the "solidarism" theory, then newly proposed, of the social economist, Heinrich Pesch, S. J. This socio-economic philosophy is regarded as a prime source of the program for the reconstruction of the social order outlined in *Quadragesimo Anno*.

This call, though never fully answered, was to help avert from the Church in America the charge of callousness and indifference to social injustice that has been levelled against Catholic leaders in other lands.¹⁰

1917 found the United States formally participating in World War I. For the Catholic Church the challenge of wartime brought forth two great results. One was the breakdown of any lingering nationalistic barriers within the Church. German Catholics and Irish Catholics became united American Catholics, in the spring of 1917. And as a consequence of the war needs there developed in this country the core-organization of Catholic Action, the National Catholic Welfare Conference.

Prior to a consideration of the founding of N.C.W.C. and of its Social Action Department, in which we are especially interested, it is necessary briefly to recall the background of the American magna charta of the movement, the "Bishops' Program for Social Reconstruction", of 1919. The story of the drafting of the "Bishops' Program", as it came to be called, makes interesting reading. Dr. Ryan, its author, tells us that between February, 1918, and June, 1919, more than sixty programs of reconstruction were drawn up and published by prominent groups of persons in Italy, France, Great Britain, and the United States.¹¹ By chance, a rough draft of proposals he had thought over in preparation for a talk, but had not used, was brought to the attention of the National Catholic War Council, by his friend, Rev. Dr. John O'Grady. The proposals were adopted by the administrative committee of the Council and published over the names of the committee members: Bishops Peter J. Muldoon, Joseph Schrembs, Patrick J. Hayes, and William T. Russell.

The effect of the program was immediate. As Ryan remarked, the proposals received more notice than any of the other programs, and were praised by a wide variety of interested parties. Not all the attention paid it was favorable, however, and the epithet of "Socialistic" was hurled against it. In fact, a legislative committee in New York reported that:

A certain group in the Catholic Church with leanings toward Socialism, under the leadership of the Rev. Dr. Ryan, professor at the Catholic University of Washington, issued in January, 1919, a pamphlet called "Social Reconstruction". . . . Where the socialistic tendency of the committee shows itself most clearly is in what is said under the heading of "Cooperation and Copartnership."¹²

But though the effect was immediate, it was not universal. Dr. Francis McMahon, a student in Catholic high school and college from 1919 to 1927, could not recall hearing of the "Bishops' Program" during all those years. It was not until after he had left college that his attention, and that of others, was brought to the work of men such as Bishop Muldoon of Rockford. The thinking of these latter was far in advance of the average Catholic social consciousness in this hey-day of capitalistic

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¹⁰ A remarkable exception is the lack of responsible Catholic reaction to the social injustices suffered by the Negro in America.

¹¹ Ryan, *Social Doctrine in Action*, pp. 143 ff.

¹² "Report of the Joint Legislative Committee Investigating Seditious Activities, filed April 24, 1920, in the Senate of the State of New York," vol. I, p. 1139. This charge was still in circulation years later, and was employed by such writers as Elizabeth Dilling, *The Red Network*, (Chicago, 1935), p. 318.

The Treaty of 1783

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THE treaty of 1783 which granted official recognition to the independence of our young republic and marked, so it seemed, so definitively the boundaries of our nation has been studied from many angles. Under any aspect it is a fascinating story. This paper proposes to investigate neither the diplomatic negotiations in Philadelphia, the French intrigues there, the influence of Gérard and Luzerne on certain members of Congress¹ which almost unmade us as a nation, nor the potent consequences of the peace in America. It is concerned, rather, with the exigencies of diplomacy which confronted our ministers in Europe, the diverse designs and conflicting dreams of France, Spain, and England out of which there came a treaty amazingly advantageous to America.

Basically, the foundations of the diplomatic structure with which Jay, Franklin, and Adams had to contend go back to the discovery of America and even beyond. Only the proximate background can be given here. Concisely the situation was this: the colonies, having fought the revolution successfully, asked as absolute terms of a treaty of peace with Great Britain, not the rights of British subjects for which they had begun the war, but the unequivocal acknowledgment of American independence and such territorial rights as they believed necessary to safeguard their sovereignty. France had allied herself with them in 1778, pledging her support on the matter of American independence, absolute and unlimited. Spain, in turn, had allied herself with France. Great Britain, it would seem, stood alone against us. But an analysis of French and Spanish motives throws an entirely different light on the matter.

The interest of France in the dissatisfaction of the American colonies became extremely acute in the year that Vergennes became Foreign Minister to Louis XVI. This was in 1774. The initiative was supplied partly from London by the French *Chargé d'affaires*, M. Garnier, who informed his superiors in France that he saw in the American colonial struggle France's opportunity of increasing her own prestige and power and of forcing England to take her place among second class states.² If we examine the map of North America drawn up in 1763, it does not seem strange that Vergennes, with this slight suggestion from abroad, began to dream. The grandeur that had once been France inspired him. Immediately he instructed Garnier to keep close watch on England's military developments, particularly the navy; but in the meantime England was to sense nothing of French interest in the colonial war.³ By the end of 1775 with Beaumarchais' aid he had convinced the king that French intervention in the colonial war for independence was imperative to

France's return to power.⁴ Even before the request for help was forthcoming, Vergennes had made all the necessary preparations.

On July 26, 1777, France invited Spain to join her in a close alliance with America which would oblige all parties not to make peace separately. Spain replied that she, too, desired England's defeat; but she advised delay on the matter of alliance and war because she feared the Americans might yet make a separate peace with Great Britain, leaving France and Spain in a dangerous position. After all, Spain asked, what substantial advantages had America promised in return for Spain's cooperation?⁵ But, we in turn may ask, was not the real reason back of Spain's refusal the fact that Spain still dreamed of an empire in America and had no wish to recognize the United States as a nation? Could we expect that she would readily agree to risk her fortunes to assure French supremacy in European affairs? Spain was to come into the picture later. In fact she was to constitute the greatest stumbling block to a peaceful conclusion of the war; but the time was not yet. So the alliance was signed without her. On February 6, 1778, the cause of American independence was linked with Vergennes' desire to crush England and to make France the greatest power on the continent.⁶ In actual consequences it meant more than this; we had involved ourselves for years to come inextricably in the complications of European diplomacy.

In March of 1778, one month after the Treaty of Alliance had been signed, the French government appointed M. Conrad Alexandre Gérard as first minister plenipotentiary to the United States. Six months later Congress elected Dr. Benjamin Franklin minister plenipotentiary to France. Vergennes' correspondence with Gérard, as likewise with Montmorin, the French ambassador in Madrid, is revealing on the nature and extent of France's motives for entering the war. Continental supremacy, rather than the desire to exploit American trade, was obviously her first objective. But was it the only one? On March 29, 1778, Vergennes wrote in his instruction to Gérard:

L'indépendance de l'Amerique septentrionale et son union permanente avec la France ont été le but principal du Roi . . . ⁷ This is not surprising—independence and yet attachment to France. In the same missive he adds, relative to Spain's probable ambitions:

Il est un point qui importe fort au Roi, et qui exigera toute la dextérité du Sr. Gérard: ce sont les stipulations à ménager en faveur de l'Espagne . . . On a lieu de présumer qu'elle désirerait s'acquérir les Florides, une part aux pêcheries sur les bancs de Terre-Neuve, et la Jamaïque. ⁸

Vergennes continues in the same strain, saying that

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

⁶ For text see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, New York, Crofts, 1935, pp. 105-107.

⁷ Henri Doniol, work mentioned in introduction, Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1886-92, III, 154.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹ On this, see J. J. Meng's excellent work, *Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gérard, 1778-1780*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1939.

² Meng, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Jamaica is already in the hands of the king and the fisheries probably will be. He is certain, however, that the Floridas enter into the American plan of conquest, a thing which Gérard is instructed to discourage together with any attempt to take Nova Scotia or Canada. His reasons for the latter are worthy of note—his majesty considers it "useful" to leave Canada in the hands of the British and to cause the Americans thereby to be constantly disquieted and in need of France's friendship and alliance.⁹ The French minister closed his instructions by reminding Gérard of the importance of the mission which the king had entrusted to him.¹⁰

Designs of statecraft to be achieved without working to Spain's disadvantage seem clearly to have dictated the policies of France even before Spain joined the allies. Enthusiasts for democracy have oftentimes tended too seriously to speak of France's participation in the philosophy of liberalism, then esteemed in the drawing rooms of the élite. But the correspondence of the Count de Vergennes, the minister responsible for getting France into the war, gives evidence of a more realistic provocation. In June, 1778, Vergennes wrote to the French representative at Madrid:

On pense peut-être à Madrid que l'intérêt d'acquérir un nouveau commerce nous a principalement décidés; ce motif . . . ne sera peut-être pour la France qu'un objet minime. Ce qui a du la déterminer et l'a déterminée en effet à se joindre à l'Amérique est le grand affaiblissement de l'Angleterre opéré par la soustraction d'un tiers de son empire.¹¹

France seems to have foreseen with remarkable accuracy that Britain, even in losing her colonies, would still keep the greater part of their trade.¹² Further proof that Vergennes' aim was in no way dictated by a sheer desire to further the liberal spirit in America is to be found in another letter to Montmorin on October 30, 1778:

Nous ne demandons l'indépendance que pour les 13 États de l'Amérique qui se sont unis entre eux, sans y comprendre aucune des autres possessions anglaises qui n'ont point participé à leur insurrection. Nous ne désirons pas à beaucoup près que la nouvelle république qui s'élève demeure maîtresse exclusive de tout cet immense continent.¹³

On the same date he informed Montmorin of the French scheme to secure Britain in her Canadian possessions that America might know the need of French guarantees and protection.

In *Our Rising Empire*, A. B. Darling expounds an interesting thesis on the character of French motives which is worthy of investigation. He sets forth the probability that French ambitions to keep Canada in British hands veiled the hope that France might someday regain Canada from the British and Louisiana from Spain. He observes that in the treaty of 1778 France's renunciation to territory in North America carefully excepted the Spanish territory west of the Mississippi and the Island of New Orleans. The French were dissatisfied with Spanish rule in Louisiana. French settlers and traders were at home in the Illinois country near St. Louis and in old Quebec. French sentiment at home supported the dream of an empire in the New World. On March 10, 1769, the French naval commander,

D'Estaing, had proposed that Louisiana be made into a free state under the joint protection of France and Spain for the benefit of French commerce in the Mississippi.¹⁴ The later treaty of San Ildefonso and Napoleon's designs on Santo Domingo give us some reason to conjecture that Darling may be right. The evidence, however, remains only circumstantial and indirect.

Archival testimony makes us certain, though, of this: France considered it to be to her vital interest so to debase British power that the French monarchy might once more enjoy the prestige it had known in the days of Louis XIV. But the position of France was precarious without the support of Spain. Accordingly, Vergennes sought persistently to bring Spain into the war. On April 12, 1779, the two powers signed the Secret Convention of Aranjuez: according to it Spain was to have Gibraltar and Minorca; France was to have control of the fortifications at Dunkirk; if France received Newfoundland, Spain was to be entitled to fishing rights there; Britain was to be expelled from Honduras, the Campeche Coast, Mobile, Pensacola, and the shores of Florida along the Bahama Channel; France again promised not to lay down arms until Great Britain recognized American independence, but on this Spain was non-committal.¹⁵ In August, Montmorin wrote to Vergennes that the King of Spain did not intend to recognize the American "rebels" unless he were compelled to do so.¹⁶ America could hardly profit from the Spanish contract with France. France had agreed not to make peace without the colonies; she now agreed not to make peace without Spain. France had saddled herself to two allies with utterly incompatible desires. American aims were, to say the least, in jeopardy.

It soon became evident to our diplomats abroad that France did not intend to defend American claims other than to insist on independence. In August of 1779 Congress voted that any peace negotiations with Great Britain must be based upon an advanced acknowledgment of American independence by the British Government.¹⁷ In the following month Congress elected John Adams minister plenipotentiary to Great Britain for the purpose of negotiating treaties of peace and commerce with that government. There was nothing in the instructions to indicate that he must look to either of the allies for guidance.¹⁸ In October of 1780 Congress advised Adams that he might make a truce with Great Britain on the former condition of recognition and on condition that Britain would remove her land and naval armaments from our territory.¹⁹

Jay received his appointment to negotiate with Spain at the same time as Adams was sent to England. He was instructed to represent to his Catholic Majesty the great distress of the United States and to solicit a loan of five million dollars to enable them to cooperate with the allies against the common enemy. But before pro-

¹⁴ A. B. Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ Doniol, III, 803-810.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, III, 753.

¹⁷ *U. S. Continental Congress Journals* (ed. W. C. Ford), Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1904-1922, XIV, 956.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, XV, 1113.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, XVIII (ed. Gaillard Hunt), 949.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

¹¹ Doniol, *op. cit.*, III, 140.

¹² A. B. Darling, *Our Rising Empire*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1940, p. 23.

¹³ Doniol, *op. cit.*, III, 561.

posing the loan, Jay was to endeavor to obtain a subsidy in return for guaranteeing Florida to Spain. The American request for free navigation of the Mississippi into and from the sea was to be considered an ultimatum. He was, furthermore, to obtain some port below the thirty-first degree of latitude for American vessels and goods.²⁰ It would seem from these instructions that Congress was uninformed on the Treaty of Aranjuez in which Spain had been so clearly hostile to the United States. It seems highly probable that Jay, too, knew nothing of the agreement between France and Spain. But his mind was already questioning the chance of success at Madrid.²¹

On May 11, 1780, Jay had a conference with Spain's prime minister, Floridablanca. There seemed at first some hope that there might be a basis of agreement on the Mississippi. But this was momentary. In the weeks that followed Floridablanca refused to see Jay, and Montmorin became the intermediary between our republic and the Spanish prime minister. Jay's temper rose as time progressed. Finally, however, Floridablanca condescended to meet with Jay and after many preliminary remarks came to the matter of navigation on the Mississippi. With some degree of warmth the Spanish minister remarked that unless Spain could exclude all nations from the Gulf of Mexico, she might as well admit all. He himself considered it, he said, "the principal object to be obtained by the war". To him it was "far more important than Gibraltar". Jay did not commit himself further.²²

For the sake of peace and of alliance with Spain Congress sent revised instructions to Jay on February 12, 1781. Jay was to desist from demanding free navigation of that part of the Mississippi below the thirty-first degree latitude or free ports below the same, if such cession were insisted on by Spain. But "free navigation of the said River above the said degree of North latitude "was to be acknowledged and guaranteed by his Catholic Majesty to the citizens of the United States in common with his own subjects. Every possible effort, however, was to be exerted to obtain the terms included in the first instructions."²³

Jay perceived, however, that Floridablanca was inclined to let these matters wait until after the signing of a general treaty of peace at the end of the war. Jay was shrewd in getting at realities. Spain's aims in a general peace conference were already evident. She would keep America weak, confined to the Alleghenies, excluded from the Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico. With Mexico, Cuba, Louisiana, and Florida she could hope to build a powerful Spanish Empire. In April of 1782 Jay sent to Livingston a letter which indicates that he was already moving in the direction of a separate peace with Britain.

Both countries are watching and jealous of us. We are at peace with Spain, and she neither will, nor indeed can, grant us a present subsidy. Why, then, should we be anxious for a treaty with her, or make sacrifices to purchase it? . . . It would not, perhaps, be wise to break with her; but delay is in our power, and resentment ought to have no influence.²⁴

On the twenty-third of June, Jay joined Franklin in Paris. Through some sort of a scheme devised by Vergennes, Austria and Russia had, shortly before the defeat of Cornwallis at Yorktown, proposed to act as mediators for a general peace, but England had declined. The general agreement by May of 1782 was that France and United States would each negotiate separately with Great Britain with the recognition of American independence still the first requisite. The treaties were to be signed concurrently. Early in June, before Jay's arrival, Franklin had learned confidentially from Grenville that the latter had authority to deal with the American commissioners apart from France and to declare their independence.²⁵ The purpose of the British Government was, undoubtedly, to separate the American states from France.²⁶ Franklin was cautious in his proceedings, however; for beyond independence there were certain territorial provisions to be obtained, and he was not sure that even now we did not need France's support. Besides there was still Spain to deal with, and her claims in the peace were not lightly to be overlooked. With Jay's arrival in Paris Franklin decided to take the matter of Spain in hand at once. Jay had had enough in Madrid to make him resolve that an alliance with Spain was now out of the question. Franklin had come to the same determination. Their first meeting with Aranda, the Spanish minister in France, meant nothing. It was not until August that the Spaniard finally made clear the nature of Spain's demands. Jay's letter to Livingston tells the story.

. . . Opening Mitchell's large map of North America, he (Count d'Aranda) asked me what were our boundaries. I told him that the boundary between us and the Spanish dominions was a line drawn from the head of the Mississippi down the middle thereof to the thirty-first degree of north latitude and from thence by the line between Florida and Georgia.

Jay then reports that Aranda entered into a long discussion of our right to such an extent and insisted mainly on two objections to it:

(1) That the western country had never belonged to or been claimed as belonging to the ancient colonies; that previous to the last war it had belonged to France, and after its cession to Britain remained a distinct part of her dominions, until by the conquest of West Florida and certain posts on the Mississippi and Illinois, it became vested in Spain.

(2) That supposing the Spanish right of conquest did not extend over all that country, still that it was possessed by free and independent nations of Indians, whose lands we could not with any propriety consider as belonging to us.

Aranda then proposed to run a longitudinal line on the east side of the river for our western boundary adding that he wished to run it in a manner that would be convenient to us, though he could never admit the extent of territory we claimed. Jay added to Livingston that he had little hope of ever agreeing with Spain since the Mississippi was and ought to be our ultimatum.²⁷

Later, in conversation with Oswald, Jay remarked that he had not proceeded far with the Spanish treaty and that unless Britain forced them into it, he did not see why we would have to fetter ourselves with one.²⁸ Oswald, "a simple, straight-forward Scottish man of

of the United States, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1889, V, 373.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 860-864.

²⁶ Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

²⁷ Wharton, VI, 22-23.

²⁸ Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 76, based on material in Sparks' *Mss.*, XL, 75-77.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, XV, 1118-20.

²¹ Darling, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

²² *U. S. Continental Congress Journals*, XVIII, 900-902.

²³ *Ibid.*, XIX, 151-3.

²⁴ Francis Wharton, *Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*

business",²⁹ had come to Paris several months before Jay's arrival there. Through him satisfactory relations had been established between Franklin and Shelburne. The latter knew Oswald to be indeed a *persona grata* to Franklin. Franklin introduced Oswald to Vergennes who informed him vaguely that France had several demands to make but would do nothing without first consulting her allies. And strangely assorted allies they were—the United States holding out for unequivocal independence first and foremost, for the Mississippi as a western boundary, for the navigation of that river to the southern boundary of the States and for a port below it, and for certain rights in the Newfoundland fisheries. Spain, on the other hand, desired to keep the Mississippi Valley for herself, was determined to possess the two Floridas, wanted the lands northwest of the Ohio to be in British rather than American control, wanted to be supreme in the Gulf of Mexico, and to obtain Gibraltar and Minorca from England. The French claims only added to the complications. France no more than Spain desired to establish the United States as a great rival power in the New World. Her intent was to place France in such a position as to hold the balance between Great Britain, Spain, and the United States. Vergennes planned to give the Floridas to Spain, but to treat the region between West Florida and the Cumberland River as an Indian district under the protection of the United States and Spain, and to recognize the territory north of the Ohio as British in accordance with the provisions of the Quebec Act of 1774.³⁰ What the proposals of France and Spain amounted to was a restriction of the United States to the same strip on the Atlantic Coast which they had occupied in 1713.³¹

When Oswald returned to England he took with him a sketch of what Franklin considered the basis of negotiations for peace with Great Britain. With amazing boldness Franklin had suggested to Oswald the British cession of Canada and Nova Scotia to the United States, land which, as Franklin said, could be sold in payment for the destruction wrought by the British and their Indians and in compensation for loyalist property.³² Franklin's implication here was that the English who had unjustly fought the revolution might thereby make not only peace but reconciliation. Doctor Franklin, shrewd old man that he was, believed in setting his terms high, yet Oswald showed neither surprise nor reluctance.³³ These were, however, as Franklin explained, only "desirable" terms, for Congress had already stated that these need not be an ultimatum.³⁴ More important and absolutely essential was the recognition of American independence, full and complete, evacuation of British troops, boundary settlements as before the Quebec Act,

and fishing rights on the Banks of Newfoundland and elsewhere.

At Franklin's request Oswald returned as England's negotiator, this time to settle the dates for a general peace and to inform Franklin according to Shelburne's instructions, that the independence of the United States³⁵ would be considered only if Great Britain were restored to the position held in 1763, that America must be truly independent of the whole world and not bind herself in any way to France, and that no idea of reparation such as Franklin had proposed could be entertained. He expected free trade to every part of America and early payment of all debts due to British subjects.³⁶ Shelburne was a man who knew how to play the game as well as Franklin.

It was Thomas Grenville who as the accredited envoy of the Foreign Office opened conversations between Great Britain and the European belligerents. Grenville bore instructions from Fox to the effect that if France rejected the *status quo* of 1763, he was to sound Franklin out on the possibilities of a separate peace. Vergennes informed Grenville that France would not be content simply with American independence nor would she consider this in any sense a concession to her; the United States must negotiate for it herself. Grenville, therefore, suggested to Fox that for the sake of making a distinct treaty and thus separating the allies, "independence might be granted to America first instead of making it a conditional article of the general treaty."³⁷ Grenville received orders to proceed as he had proposed, and Oswald was instructed to make peace either general or separate with the American commissioners at what the king termed "the dreadful price of independence".³⁸

On June 30, 1782, with Rockingham's death, Shelburne succeeded to the ministry, replacing Grenville by Alleyne Fitzherbert. By this date John Jay had succeeded in convincing Franklin that France and Spain were out for their own gains and not for the interests of America. A letter intercepted by the British government from M. de Marbois to Vergennes and a memorandum from Rayneval heightened Jay's distrust of the allies.³⁹ John Adams, who had joined his colleagues in Paris, and who had a horror of Frenchmen in general, and of Vergennes in particular, agreed with Jay on the matter of separate negotiations with the British. Being a good New Englander he was especially shocked at Vergennes' position regarding the fisheries. On September 1, 1782, Great Britain agreed to recognize American independence absolutely and irrevocably as an article of the treaty and to adopt Franklin's "necessary" articles as the basis of the agreement. Oswald had been instructed that the right of drying fish on Newfoundland's shores should not be ceded, that treaty stipulations must be made regarding the payment of debts to the British, but that Britain's claims to the ungranted domains and territory

²⁹ C. Headlam, "The American Revolution and British Politics, 1776-1783," *Cambridge History of the British Empire* (ed. J. H. Rose), New York, Macmillan Company, 1929, I, 770.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 771.

³² For detailed discussion, see J. Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History*, New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1888, p. 9.

³³ See S. F. Bemis, "Canada and the Peace Settlement of 1782-3," *The Canadian Historical Review*, XIV (Sept., 1933), 265-284.

³⁴ *U. S. Journals of Continental Congress*, XIV, 959.

³⁵ Shelburne, wishing for a federal union, came reluctantly to the idea of independence. Headlam, *op. cit.*, p. 773.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 772.

³⁷ Headlam, *op. cit.*, 774, from the correspondence of May 14, 1782, F. O., France 27/2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, from the *Correspondence of George III* (ed. Fortescue), I, 333.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 776, from *W. Jay's Life of John Jay*, New York, 1833, I, 490.

between the Mississippi and the Alleghenies might be waived, to provide, in part, such restitution. When Oswald proved too much inclined to favor the American's position on the right of drying fish and on compensation to the loyalists, the British sent Henry Strachey, an able and experienced diplomat to insist on these details as conditions of a treaty. Franklin stood firmly against the payment of debts to the loyalists. Finally it was agreed that a clause should be inserted in the treaty to the effect that there should be no further persecution of the loyalists and that Congress should recommend to the respective states the restitution of confiscated property.⁴⁰ On November 30, 1782, the nine preliminary articles of peace were signed by British and American representatives at Paris. The provisional treaty made in November became a definitive peace between Great Britain and the United States on September 3, 1783.⁴¹ The treaty acknowledged American independence as the very basis of peace negotiations. According to the territorial settlements, the boundaries of the United States included the entire region east of the Mississippi from the Lake of the Woods and the Great Lakes down to the thirty-first degree of latitude, the Chattahoochee River, and a line drawn straight from its juncture with the Flint to the St. Mary's River and thence to the Atlantic Ocean. Together with fishing rights off the shores of Newfoundland and in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence the Americans received the privilege of drying and curing fish on the unsettled shores of Nova Scotia, Labrador, and the Magdalen Islands. Creditors of both parties were to meet with no lawful impediment in the collection of debts. The article regarding compensation to the loyalists has already been mentioned.⁴² There were to be no further confiscations or prosecutions against those who had participated in the war. British soldiers were to be withdrawn and prisoners released. Negroes and other American property were to be left untouched. Free navigation of the Mississippi from its source to the ocean was accorded to both nations.⁴³

Vergennes accused Franklin of having broken faith with France. Franklin apologized for what he termed "a want of diplomatic courtesy". This is not the place to examine the ethical aspects of the separate negotiations with England, but surely in the light of all that transpired between France and Spain and later between France and England, it would seem that we were not bound to acquiesce in France's dream of enriching herself and Spain at our expense.

Great Britain and France and Spain signed preliminaries of peace at Versailles on January 20, 1783. These became definitive on May 20, 1784. France received St. Pierre and Miquelon, St. Lucia and Tobago, plus the right of fishing in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence and minor concessions in India. All articles relative to

Dunkirk were abrogated. Spain obtained Minorca and the two Floridas (in place of Gibraltar) and restored to the British all their captured possessions.⁴⁴

It is unnecessary to comment that the greatest of Spanish gains were only short-lived. In the end Great Britain did not lose too heavily by the treaties of 1783 and 1784, though it is true that for the million of francs which France expended on the war she had the satisfaction of severing from the British Empire the most priceless of her possessions. The most significant result of the Treaty of 1783, however, was the rise of a new nation, a nation whose birth had been, and whose development was yet to be, determined greatly by the forces at play in the ever-recurring struggle for the European balance of power.

⁴⁴ S. F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1942, pp. 62-3.

American Revolution

(Continued from page fifty-six)

there are twenty-five thousand documents in the papers of Sir Henry Clinton, commander in chief from 1778 to 1782. An analysis of these Clinton papers reveals the presence of two hundred and ten volumes of loose letters and documents, three hundred and fifty campaign maps, and fifty volumes of letter books, letters and military intelligence, such as the arrival or departure of vessels, cargo manifests, lists of officers, casualty lists, reports of regimental strength and personnel, and communications of spies and observers of all sorts.

With these Clinton papers before him the scholar can move unobserved about the British army; he can sit in on staff meetings and overhear the discussion of campaign plans; he can look over the shoulder of the commander as he scans reports or signs orders; and, step by step, he can follow the unfolding of Arnold's treason, just as with the assistance of the Gage papers he can eavesdrop on the intrigues of Benjamin Thompson, and thus confirm the suspicions of Thompson's contemporaries, Washington among them. Similarly the nine thousand documents of the American General Greene offer the same opportunities in regard to the forces under his command. It is no exaggeration to aver that in this library alone there are more records than any scholar can hope to examine, collate and translate into narrative in a lifetime, even if longevity be his good fortune.

Is it any wonder that as depositories acquired such riches and promptly made them available, thus giving an impetus to scholarship, investigators flocked to these centers? For decades the American Revolution has been studied by a host of men and women, not a few of whom have published their findings. Among the subjects studied are the background and interlocking causes of the rupture with England; central, state and local government; the military and diplomatic aspects of the struggle; the ideologies and political theories of individuals and groups; treason and intrigue; the use and effects of propaganda; the attitude of other countries and their relations with the new republic; the activities of various classes, professions and communities; and the part

⁴⁰ This was one provision of the treaty which the States failed to respect, hence the British occupied western forts until 1797.

⁴¹ For text see H. S. Commager, *Documents of American History*, pp. 117-119.

⁴² For John Adams' very admirable stand on the payment of British debts see John B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, New York, Appleton-Century, 1938, I, 107-108.

⁴³ The cession of Canada was not mentioned, but we had not relinquished hope of obtaining it. See J. W. Pratt, *The Expansionists of 1812*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1925.

played by individual states and areas. Still other fruits were more complete collections of the writings of the leaders, regimental histories, and biographies of national and local heroes. Novels too, of varying worth, issued from the press, and fostered interest on the part of the public.

To what extent has the knowledge thus garnered by scholars gained acceptance? This cannot be known with certainty. One authority has voiced the opinion that scholars are in advance of text books by at least a decade, and that the public lags behind the text books by at least another decade. Perhaps this is an overstatement, but it is certain that if people are slow to learn they are slower to unlearn, because they are reluctant to give up beliefs however unwarranted by facts. Popular traditions, especially if they are erroneous, are long-lived, and they cannot be changed over night.

And yet, despite recent and current activity, the American Revolution is still a promising subject for the youthful historian, who has to make the choice of a field for study. If light has been shed upon many obscure points, and if many puzzles have been solved, there are still many angles of the subject that are either unexplored or only worked over casually. It is astonishing, for example, how many of the leaders in the Revolution await a scholarly biography. In short, the study of the War for Independence still pays big dividends.

Monumenta Historica

(Continued from page fifty-two)

Jerome Nadal knew Ignatius at Paris but he did not join his little group. Only after many years when he was a priest did he join the Society at Rome, where he made his profession in 1552. It was he who promulgated the Constitutions. By appointment of Ignatius he visited Sicily, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Austria, and Italy; he gave instructions to Jesuits in community and individually on the Constitutions and answered their difficulties. Under succeeding generals he was made official visitor to different provinces. His letters²² stretch from 1546 to 1577.

They were sent to Ignatius and later to Laynez and Borgia, and give detailed reports concerning religious discipline, studies, finances, the founding of colleges, relations with bishops, the defense of the faith against the heretics, etc. No one had a fuller knowledge of the whole Society in Europe. He numbered among his friends the leading protagonists of the faith in Europe, popes, cardinals, bishops. The volumes contain also letters written to him or about him by ecclesiastics and seculars; these throw many an intimate light on the workings of the Counter Reformation. The last volume contains instructions for aiding the Church and the Society.

John Polanco was the secretary of Ignatius for the last nine years of the latter's life. He had access to the archives, and through his hands passed the correspondence of Ignatius. No one knew Ignatius better, nor was any one else in such an ideal position to know the early history of the Society. His life of Ignatius

is contained in volume I of his *Monumenta*,²³ while the remaining volumes contain his chronicle on the origins of the Society from 1537 to 1556, i. e., to the year of St. Ignatius' death. In passing he said that these volumes are not done with the best critical skill.²⁴ The chronicle is an authoritative source drawn on by early Jesuit historians. Later, letters by and to Polanco and short historical notes of his were published.²⁵ These include letters from 1542 to 1576, the year of his death. While most of them treat of domestic affairs, some are of general interest, such as those written from Trent, which give accounts of intimate scenes of the Council in session there.

Francis Borgia was the fourth Duke of Gandia. He abdicated his dignity, entered the Society of Jesus and became its third general, a position he held for seven years up to his death. In the first volume of his *Monumenta*²⁶ documents relating to his family tree are given. Among them are some concerning Callistus III and Alexander VI. The rest of the volume contains letters written by the brothers, sisters, and children of Francis Borgia. The remaining volumes contain letters written by and to Borgia dating from 1535, when he was in the service of Charles V, to a few days before his death in 1572. Borgia was one of the leading figures in the Church in the second half of the sixteenth century. He sent missionaries to Brazil, Japan, and Florida, went as legate of the Holy See to Spain, Portugal and France and helped to carry out the reform decrees of the Council of Trent. All these activities are reflected in the letters in these volumes.

Peter Ribadeneira, born in 1526, entered the Society in 1540. During his seventy years in the Society he filled many important posts and worked in many parts of Europe. In his *Monumenta*²⁷ are the letters written by and to him dating from 1545 to 1610. On the whole they deal with intimate affairs of the Society, and the same is true of the other writings contained in these volumes.

St. Ignatius prescribed in 1546 that every four months an account should be written of what was edifying in each province and sent on to Rome. Later he incorporated this prescription into the Constitutions of the Society.²⁸ The letters in these seven volumes,²⁹ written in compliance with this prescription, cover the period, 1546 to 1562,³⁰ and were sent to Rome from all over Europe. Letters from the missions are not included, being reserved for the future mission section of the *Monumenta*. While such edifying letters do not give all the truth, yet they do not falsify, and they serve

²² *Epistolae P. Hieronymi Nadal* (4 vols., Madrid, 1898-1905).

²³ *Vita Ignatii Loiolae et Rerum Societatis Jesu Historia* (6 vols., Madrid, 1894-98).

²⁴ Rodeles, *op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34.

²⁵ *Polanci Complementa* (2 vols., Madrid, 1916-17).

²⁶ *Sanctus Franciscus Borgia* (5 vols., Madrid, 1894-1911).

²⁷ *Patris Petri de Ribadeneira Confessiones, Epistolae Aliaque Scripta Inedita* (2 vols., Madrid, 1920-23).

²⁸ Part VIII, chap. 1, M. Juan de la Torre, S. J., *Constitutiones Societatis Jesu Latinae et Hispanicae cum earum Declarationibus* (Madrid, 1892), pp. 234-5.

²⁹ *Litterae Quadrimestres* (7 vols., Madrid, 1894-1925, Rome, 1932).

³⁰ These Letters were replaced by Annual Letters in 1565 by the Second General Congregation, decrees 37, 54. *Institutum Societatis Jesu* (3 vols., Florence, 1892-93), II, 203, 205.

the historian by supplying many facts, such as the number of students in a school, the erection of new buildings, the administration of the sacraments, etc.³¹

The collection of the *Epistolae Mixtae*³² forms a striking contrast to and complements the former. Written to Rome from all over Europe these letters contain matter that was meant only for the superior and was to be kept secret, such as information pertaining to the apostolic work of the Society, attacks made upon its members, relations between superiors and subjects, etc. They were written mainly by Jesuits, but a considerable number also by friends of the Society, ecclesiastical and lay. This collection, comprising letters from 1537 to 1556, gives the historian an insight into the intimate life of the Society and of its reactions on the world outside it.

While the final draft of the *Ratio Studiorum* was completed in 1599 and remained the plan according to which Jesuit schools were conducted until the Suppression of the Society in 1773, the first draft was made in 1586. Yet, for almost forty years before this date colleges for extern students were in existence. In the *Monumenta Paedagogica*³³ are contained the various methods of teaching, studies, rules for recreation, moral training, etc. used in these schools in the different countries of Europe before 1586.³⁴ This collection of documents is important for a correct understanding of the *Ratio*.

³¹ For an evaluation of such "edifying" sources see *Litterae Quadrimestres*, V, vi-xx.

³² *Epistolae Mixtae* (5 vols., Madrid, 1898-1901).

³³ *Monumenta Paedagogica* (Madrid, 1901).

³⁴ A compendious description is found in William J. McGucken, S. J., *The Jesuits and Education* (Milwaukee, 1932), p. 20. See also Allan P. Farrell, S. J., *The Jesuit Code of Liberal Education* (Milwaukee, 1938), pp. 169-185.

The Aerarium

(Continued from page fifty-four)

the advanced nations may resume their progress under peaceful conditions, a lack of productive facilities in other areas will make for a breakdown in world markets, and this in turn will lead to economic maladjustment in the great producing sections.

A Roman Instrument of Capital Transfer

It is evident from what has been mentioned concerning the effects of civil war before the establishment of the Roman Empire that the capital structure of the Roman world—its arable tracts and manufacturing equipment—was in a poor state of repair. Both Italy and the provinces were anxious to use all available funds in an effort to furbish local establishments which were suffering from the ravishment of war. Peaceful centers could use all available money to develop their own industry and commerce. Richer areas had ample opportunities for lucrative investment of their incomes. Under these conditions it is very doubtful that a large-scale and world-wide rehabilitation would have been effected had there been no strong leadership, a leadership that was capable of securing funds and supervising their use in the interest of a general prosperity, shared by richer and poorer provinces alike. The early Roman

Emperors constituted such a leadership. Their success in developing a political organization in which agricultural and industrial productivity was profuse is admitted on all sides, but their technique and policy in achieving the capital transfers which was so necessary for this success have received an evaluation far short of their worth—and this in spite of the fact that the accomplishments of the early emperors along these lines afford a lesson of prime moment for policy formation in matters of international trade and commerce.

From their earliest beginnings as a nation the Romans deposited surplus revenues in the Aerarium (strong room) of the temple of Saturn. Through the long period of the Republic this surplus, increased enormously by the gains of conquest, grew to important dimensions.²¹ It was composed of money collected in payment of taxes in the provinces; and since each province had its own *fiscus*, the surplus sent to Rome was made up of revenue in excess of what was needed for ordinary administrative expenses in the provinces. Thus, the Aerarium was a huge capital fund whereby the surplus revenues of the more affluent localities could be shifted for investment in less favored provinces. The Republic, however, never fostered wholesome economic growth in the provinces. Looking on any form of autarchy as dangerous to Roman interests, the provincial governors seldom went to great lengths in providing means for economic improvement of their territories.²² Because of this exploitative view the Aerarium was used primarily to defray the cost of road construction and military campaigns. The civil wars saw the fund lose much of its vigour and, finally, become almost extinct. The tax policies of the early emperors, however—while they were far from perfect—were of such a nature as to build up revenues for the Aerarium without, at the same time, stifling local business or agrarian initiative.²³ The capable emperors were always solicitous about this fund, joining the imperial *fiscus* to it at an early date.²⁴ The profligate rulers, of course, took advantage of this amalgamation, a condition that occasioned great waste of the Aerarium funds, and it was only with difficulty that responsible emperors were able to restore solvency.²⁵ The early example of Augustus, who secured the integrity of the Aerarium by contributing 600 million *denarii* (\$102,000,000) from his personal fortune, was followed by all the better emperors down to 1235 A.D.²⁶

More important than these efforts to secure solvency was the restoration of Aerarium theory to its primitive status. The emperors adopted the earlier concept of this fund as a surplus revenue holding which could be used in transferring money from the more advanced provinces to those places where organization was new or deteriorated. This fact had either been overlooked or underestimated by most writers. Thus, one scholar, following Tacitus,²⁷ notes that the Aerarium "was little more (sic) than a clearing house in which surpluses were deposited and redistributed."²⁸ In the light of the Roman economic problem of 30 B.C., however, it was precisely as a "clearing house in which surpluses

²³ Cary, *op. cit.*, 509.

²⁴ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 55.

²⁵ Cary, *op. cit.*, 555.

²⁶ G. H. Stevenson, "The Financial Reforms of Augustus" *The Cambridge Ancient History* X, 193.

²¹ Cary, *op. cit.*, 85.

²² Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 409.

were deposited and redistributed" that the Aerarium was of utmost importance.

Methods of Investment

The emperors used Aerarium funds in two ways. First, by direct expenditure on urgent provincial needs they were able to achieve a transfer of capital funds from all parts of the empire to needy areas. Secondly, through a regular credit policy they made the Aerarium funds available to those individuals who were able and willing to pay the interest rates demanded. In the early days of imperial rule the expenses of military organization also were defrayed by money from this fund. After the establishment of a separate *aerarium militare*, however, the Aerarium proper was free of this drain and was applied to non-military needs, the chief of which was the extension of urban development. All the capable emperors were promoters of the extension of city organization. Augustus founded forty new cities during his time, and this policy was continued by all the great emperors of the first two centuries. Though in its later stages the founding of new municipalities was gradual and without noteworthy expense to the central funds, in its beginnings this policy involved a new departure, which demanded great energy from the early emperors and exacted tremendous expenditures from the Aerarium. Harbors in the East had to be dredged and improved; mineral output in Spain could be increased only if new roads were constructed; the rivers of Gaul needed care if navigation on those important arteries was not to be impeded. These undertakings required large sums of money; in addition there were the expenditures for aqueducts, public buildings, and other elements of general framework for the towns themselves. It is evident that these new territories could not finance the work. Neither could most of the older provinces, suffering as they were from the long period of war. It was necessary that the Aerarium should be applied to those projects according to their importance in the general scheme of things. It is true that the peaceful conditions occasioned by the restoration of orderly governing processes did much to bring about that feeling of security in which enterprise thrives. It is likewise true that the new roads and the improved conditions of sea travel did much to promote the flow of commerce. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that the large-scale productive enterprises that made their appearance with the Empire would have been possible without a great increase of urbanization, a phenomenon dependent to a great extent upon the availability of large sums of money from the Aerarium.

In the light of their 400 years of history it must be granted that the Roman towns were not superficial establishments. Yet, they would have been quite superficial had they been merely the framework erected by these early imperial expenditures. For it requires more than harbors, public buildings, and aqueducts to form a thriving urban society. There must be an efficient, independent economic organization, and at the beginning of the Christian Era this involved a good coordination of the agrarian activities of the country with the

industrial pursuits of the cities. It must be remembered that Asia Minor and Syria had retrogressed into an organization based on household economies, and that the undeveloped sections of the West were never above this stage of economic method. A household economy supposes that each family group supplies most of its own needs by growing its own food and fabricating its own clothes, furniture, and other necessities. It is a difficult task for such an economy to raise its standard of living, because increased production can be achieved only if the members of the community divide up the necessary work, each one specializing in some definite task and producing for the community's needs along one line. To do this was especially difficult for the men of the period under consideration. Since the food supply was always an uncertainty, men were unwilling to trust to others in this all-important matter; and the result was that each one engaged in a variety of productive pursuits, never becoming an outstanding producer in any of them.

The Aerarium as a source of credit supply did much to break this system of household economies and usher in an era of higher productive ability based on labor specialization. By extending credit from the Aerarium the emperors made it possible for inhabitants of the new cities of the West and the resurgent ones of the East, whether they were colonizers from older sections or members of the existing local population, to develop small land holdings in the countryside surrounding the cities. This made it possible for the urban centers to acquire an artisan class, for, with their food supply secured to some extent by their landed holdings and improved agricultural abilities in virtue of these small holdings, men were able to give themselves to work in specialized lines.²⁸ In this way the roving tribes of the newer provinces as well as the secluded rural populations around the old Hellenistic cities of Asia Minor and Syria were attracted into the organization of the cities to become active elements of a healthy municipal organization.²⁹ In addition to the loans for small agrarian holdings and the development of cultivation, which of themselves involved large sums of money, the Aerarium supplied direct credit to the new industries that appeared in the towns. Thus, the task of financing large parts of the Roman economy was in the hands of the Aerarium, a fact that is made clear from the actions of various emperors in canceling all debts to the central treasury in times of depression or calamity. But even in periods of stress the work of the Aerarium went on, and there is evidence that it was an accepted practice of the emperors to provide funds for the relief of distressed areas from this central fund whenever the abilities of local citizens were incapable of meeting the adverse situation.³¹

Results

If we consider the condition of the provinces at the inception of imperial rule, it is difficult to imagine how the renaissance of the old Hellenistic centers and the expansion of city life in the frontier communities could have been accomplished in such a short time and on such a large scale without the enlightened spending and

²⁸ Stevenson, *op. cit.*, 195.

²⁹ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 203.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 237.

²⁷ Tacitus, *Annals*, XIII, 29.

loan activities of the Aerarium.³² The evidence shows that shortly after the time of Augustus industry and commerce increased throughout the Empire at a tremendous rate. The cities of the eastern Mediterranean reclaimed their lost greatness as textile centers, becoming the source of supply for an empire-wide demand for woolen, silk, and linen goods. They were also the chief clearing ports for increased commerce from the Orient by the overland route. Besides its exports of grain and wine, Gaul contributed a large portion to the commercialized production, its glass and pottery products finding their way to remote sections. Huge quantities of gold, silver, copper, lead, tin, and iron were shipped out of Spain in a raw state, but local industry in that province, especially in steel and textiles, changed its position from that of an exploited area to a place of prominence among the great exporters of manufactured goods.³³ Egypt, Italy, Africa, and the islands of the Mediterranean continued in their traditional productive activities, enhanced and stabilized now by the increased markets based on greater buying power in the other provinces. It is from this standpoint that the great changes noted in the new West and the rehabilitated East are important, because, since the increased commerce was in basic commodities,³⁴ the standards of living must have been raised to a considerable extent throughout the Empire. The very existence of the increased commercial activity demands such a conclusion, for, as was mentioned above, it is impossible to increase trade and industry without markets, and markets are in turn dependent upon the productive ability of the consumers themselves. The findings of archaeological investigation bear this out. The large number of luxurious villas and the plethora of palatial homes in every city of the Empire, whatever their social significance, can only indicate an increase of wealth throughout the whole Roman world after the foundation of the Empire.

The diffusion of productive enterprises, the upward surge of the provinces in both the East and West to a plane of equality with Egypt and Italy,³⁵ and the increased living standards throughout the Empire are effects of a variety of causes. The eventuality proved that the devastated and backward areas were alike capable of great productive enterprise. The peaceful conditions, the improved modes of communication, the stability of political conditions—all had a great deal to do with the actuation of these potentialities. It must also be admitted that the operations of the Aerarium had considerable effect in bringing about the new conditions of trade and industry. A financial impetus was needed to begin the great process of development: the Aerarium furnished that impetus through direct expenditure on the framework of the new cities. A source of money was needed to supply the new municipal populations with loans in order to found them securely in the new economy of specialization; here again the Aerarium was an instrument of expansionist policy. Finally, the circumstances obtaining at the time of this movement's

inception were such that capital had to flow from the wealthier sectors into the poorer ones: this most probably would not have been accomplished except for the existence and proper use of such an international fund as the Aerarium. Past evaluations of the Aerarium have failed for lack of stress in these important matters. It would also seem that the plans under way at the present time with a view to world development have an important historical precedent in the actions of Augustus and his successors in their efforts to provide means for reconstruction and expansion in the Empire.

Social Catholics

(Continued from page fifty-eight)

abandon.¹³

Note should be made here of an important contribution of Archbishop Schrembs to the cause of Social Catholicism. Due to an unfortunate misunderstanding occasioned by the misgivings of a few American Bishops about the juridical authority (non-existent) of the Conference, Pius XI, shortly after his election to the papacy, suppressed the organization. The majority of the bishops, realizing that it was a case of misunderstanding on Rome's part, selected Bishop Schrembs to represent the matter to the Holy See. This was done successfully and the Conference was reinstituted with papal blessing. The importance of this action has been pointed out by Archbishop John McNicholas, O.P.:

I am sure I express the mind of many Bishops and priests when I say that the services of Archbishop Schrembs on this occasion—his utter forgetfulness of self, his wholehearted dedication to the cause for which he pleaded, eloquently, patiently, and dramatically—are among the most notable ever rendered by any Bishop of our Hierarchy to the Church.¹⁴

As Archbishop McNicholas further remarked, succeeding years proved the truth of Schrembs' argument for the Conference. "(Schrembs) was consoled to have the cause for which he so earnestly and heroically pleaded, not only vindicated, but wholeheartedly approved by two Supreme Pontiffs."

Despite its history of splendid achievements, the reception of the Social Action Department and its parent organization has not been uniform.¹⁵ Opposition, however, has been of little moment because the policies of the department have been sustained by papal writings and by the authority of successive episcopal chairmen: Bishops Muldoon, Thomas F. Lillis, Edwin V. O'Hara, and Karl J. Alter. In 1931, the publication of *Quadragesimo Anno* not only served as the impulse which forwarded and directed Social Catholicism into a more influential position, but as an *imprimatur* on the work of Ryan, McGowan, and other leaders, and a confirmation of the policies adopted by the hierarchy of this country through the N.C.W.C. As Bishop Thomas J.

¹³ Francis E. McMahon, *A Catholic Looks at the World*, (New York, 1945), p. 70.

¹⁴ In a sermon preached at funeral of Archbishop Schrembs, reported in *Catholic Action*, XXVII, December, 1945, pp. 14-15.

¹⁵ e.g. "Many business men in this country might with reason claim that the N.C.W.C. is the real traitor to our country, for they propose a series of changes in the method of governing this country which must inevitably result in the Fascism or Communism they seek to avoid." Letter to the Editor, *Commonweal*, XXIII, January 31, 1936, p. 381.

³¹ Christopher Dawson, *Making of Europe* (New York; Sheed and Ward, 1934) 10.

³² Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-7.

³³ F. Oertel, *op. cit.*, 388.

³⁴ Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.*, 148.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 150.

Shahan, rector of the Catholic University at the time, remarked, "this (*Quadragesimo Anno*) is a great vindication for John Ryan."

With the year 1931 the tyro stage of Social Catholicism was definitely left behind. We have traced its beginnings in the troubled days when the American Church first found itself an adult institution. Under the stimulus of social and economic disturbances, a few advanced churchmen were directed to a study of the social question. By the chance of war the movement came upon a measure of organization through the continuation of the National Catholic War Council in the present Welfare Conference of the bishops, and in particular through the establishment of the Social Action Department. Still, it was not until the early thirties that Social Catholicism of the American brand came into full

growth. Vaguely conscious, for the most part, of their social mission, the publication of *Quadragesimo Anno* and the self-conscious beginnings of the "New Deal" in national policy gave an impulse to American Catholics. Under its influence they saw their way clear to carry forward the great projects in the fields of labor, rural life, and national or international social and economic policy that have made the American Church the social force that it had become by 1945¹⁶

¹⁶ That the importance of N.C.W.C., the Social Action Department, and Catholic social policies, is recognized by those outside the Church was made clear by a significant series of articles in *The Christian Century*, of November 29, 1944, to January 17, 1945. Through eight articles Harold E. Fey asks the question: "Can Catholicism Win America?" Particularly in view of the effective organization provided by N.C.W.C., he concluded to a possible surrender by Protestant America to Catholicism.

Recent Books in Review

European History

Wartime Mission in Spain, by Carlton J. H. Hayes.
New York. The Macmillan Company. 1945. viii
+ 313. \$3.00

Ever since the beginning of the second Spanish republic in 1931, but especially since the outbreak of the civil war in 1936, Americans have been particularly interested in the fortunes and in the government of Spain. During the civil war (1936-1939) opinion in this country became strongly divided as between those favoring the "Loyalists" (Left Republicans, Socialists, Anarchists, Syndicalists, Communists, Basque Nationalists, Catalan Nationalists and leftists and radicals of almost infinite variety) and those favoring the "Insurgents", who had rebelled under the leadership of General Francisco Franco against the divided and tottering republic. Spaniards who supported this side of the national schism consisted of the larger part of the army, the majority of churchmen, Monarchists both conservative and liberal, the oldtime Carlists and Requetés of the northwest, conservative and liberal Republicans, the Falangistas, and an almost infinite variety of those of the Center and Right. The heat of controversy which was engendered among North Americans was extraordinary, and people and the press took sides (almost as if it were our own civil war) much too ardently, so that very often light and intelligent judgment were excluded. Ignorance of the facts and a naive simplification of the situation partly accounted for the phenomenon. Now, the author of the present book, Dr. Carlton J. H. Hayes was one of the few who kept his head and viewed both sides of the struggle in Spain. This was in accord with his quality of detached intellectualism and serene objectivity which has made him the great historian, fit choice of President Franklin Roosevelt as wartime ambassador to Spain (May, 1942-January, 1945), and probably among all North Americans the most able to write such a book as this.

Because the heat of controversy and partisanship concerning Spain continues to exist in this country, it is a particular advantage to have at this time so thoroughly informed and so judicious a work. For this book is not only an account of the activities of an extraordinarily successful ambassador of the United States during a most crucial period in the history of the nation and of the world, but also an evaluation of the Spanish character, of national politics, and of Spanish wartime international relations. In addition to the above, the work offers a valuable study of how a sympathetic and judicious diplomacy was able to win precious concessions which bluster and threat would never have extracted from a proud, stubborn, and sensitive people.

Those who wish to understand the Spanish character and its proverbial ineptness in constitutional government should read and ponder certain passages of the second chapter: "First Contacts and Impressions". Almost a century ago, at the time of the sanguinary collapse of the First Republic (1873) the Spanish General Castelar said of his countrymen: "The Right sees in each member of the Left a demagogue, and the Left sees in each

member of the Right a traitor. . . . We republicans have many prophets, few politicians; we know much of the ideal, little of experience; we embrace the entire Heaven of thought, and stumble over the first hole in the road." It is instructive to compare this passage with what Carlton Hayes writes a few years after the sanguinary collapse of the Second Republic: "But just as an extreme individualism was a great virtue of the mass of Spaniards, so was it, especially in political matters, a vice. They simply couldn't or wouldn't think alike or act together. And every one was so sure he was right that he was apt to be intolerant of dissent or opposition. Compromise was alien and unpopular. You were either a 'patriot' or a 'red' (page 43). Therefore judiciously our author comments: "Moreover, any majority of Spaniards who might support a republic would not consist of two large and moderate parties. . . , but would comprise a variety of factions so disparate as to render extremely difficult the maintenance of a united and really democratic front against Communist advocates of a 'proletarian dictatorship' on one side and 'Rightist' champions of monarchy or a military dictatorship on the other" (page 306). The author does not like the present dictatorship or any dictatorship, but he knows that Spanish republics have been torn apart from the "Right" and from the "Left", and he fears that this might happen again were an attempt made speedily or forcibly to upset the present regime.

Because of the intelligent diplomacy of our ambassador, Spain advanced during these years in her relations with the United Nations from a state of mere "non-belligerency" to that of "neutrality", and finally to a "benevolent neutrality". Among the advantages gained were the "withdrawal of the Blue Division [from Russia]; cessation of most of the discrimination against the United States and Great Britain in press and radio; grant of allied control over Axis nationals between peninsular Spain and Spanish Morocco; direct evacuation of French refugees; withholding or recognition of the new Mussolini regime; Spanish backing of Portugal's concession of military bases in the Azores." Dr. Hayes makes it very clear how efforts to obtain these and other advantages from the Spanish Government, such as denial to Germany of the precious wolfram, were being constantly embarrassed by certain groups of ultra-liberals and their publications in the United States, who, the author reflects, seemed more intent on renewing the civil war in Spain than in aiding their own government successfully to carry out the war effort in that country.

Every section of Spanish political partisanship wanted to keep out of the war and dreaded any danger of reversion to civil war. The Spanish Government, therefore, had to play a very careful game, for Hitler's armies were poised at the Pyrenees and might at any time overrun Spain, capture Gibraltar, close the Mediterranean, and frustrate our North African campaign. Franco must pay lip-service, then, to the Axis, while (partly because of our successful diplomacy) refusing passage through Spain to Hitler's divisions. As Allied arms began and continued a victorious career, this intense fear of Spaniards gradually lessened and then disappeared.

Ambassador Hayes makes it clear that the "Falange" was

only one of the multiplex elements of Spanish politics. He repeatedly protested against this body's "Fascist" spirit and accoutrements. After Suñer's dismissal from the office of Foreign Minister its influence declined, and our ambassador was assured that through a process of gradual evolution the "Fascist" element would be gradually eliminated. Both General Franco and the top ministers of Spain desired the friendship of the United States, and they were well aware that the American people detest "Fascism" and all its works.

This reviewer wishes to conclude with a reflection on the error of groups of over-ardent or narrow Catholics who still seem to identify the Spanish regime with the Catholic Church. The Spanish dictatorship, Ambassador Hayes makes clear, does not represent the Catholic Church. It represents only a large portion (probably a majority) of the Spanish people. We should ponder likewise the erroneous and very naive policy of groups of ultra-Liberals in the United States who during the war cried out, and who still continue to cry out against the Spanish regime and who press for its overthrow. We are committed to non-intervention by the Atlantic Charter; to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." This book demonstrates that in 1945 the Spanish regime was supported by at least fifty per cent of the Spanish people; that the other fifty per cent were hopelessly divided; that swift change or overthrow would in all probability lead to another civil war which no faction of Spaniards desired to see renewed. Our former ambassador pertinently remarks: "The propaganda of Spanish exiles and of the extremist element in our press had obviously implanted in the American mind a hostile stereotype, in the nature of a caricature, which the silence of our Government had served to confirm."

University of San Francisco

PETER MASTEN DUNNE, S. J.

A Price for Peace, The New Europe and World Markets,
by Antonin Basch. New York. Columbia University
Press. 1945. pp. 209. \$2.50

There is no doubt that this book is a rather valuable contribution to the postwar literature pertaining to the most vital problem of European reconstruction; for it gives in many instances illuminating and stimulating information. Yet, it can hardly meet with the wholehearted approval of this reviewer who himself happens to have devoted quite a few publications to the thorny problem of economic integration of Central Europe. One certainly can not deny that this problem never before presented such a difficulty for a professional economist who tries to be impartial in his recommendations, as now, when a general political insecurity prevails all over the world, and Europe is suffering from chaos and social upheaval. It is almost a provocative venture to write under such circumstances a scholarly book analysing the integration of Europe's economy or her future position in World Trade.

As long as it remains unknown how far the Soviet Union will succeed in her efforts to communize Europe and what will happen to Germany and Italy, which used to be the very backbone of Central Europe, any scientific analysis of Europe's economic possibilities and aspirations will remain but a vague conjecture. It is quite evident that Dr. Basch realizes the obstacles with which his analytic work is confronted; the picture of future Europe which he draws is evidently obscure, and the recommendations which he gives are often evasive.

When an author is expected to analyze a highly confused problem, he must introduce some fixed assumptions to serve as a norm, so that any development which might occur in reality could be interpreted as a certain more or less logical deviation from that norm. These assumptions must have, however, a very high degree of probability; otherwise the whole analysis of the assumed situation will have no practical significance. Dr. Basch has rather failed to fulfill this requirement, because he assumes that Soviet Russia might be willing to reestablish a non-communistic Europe by entering into a sincere economic cooperation with her capitalistic neighbors, and because he is reluctant to say openly that the reduction of Germany, Austria, and Italy to an agricultural status will make any reconstruction of Europe absolutely impossible, unless the dense population of these countries is rationally exterminated or artificially supported by the non-European powers. Of course, Dr. Basch does not entirely idealize the present imperialistic tendencies of the Soviet Union; nor does he advocate a radical deindustrialization of the former leading economic powers of Central Europe. Yet, a casual reader of his book may get such an impression, while a more inquisitive critic will certainly look in vain for a constructive

device which would enable him to forecast the possible present development of Europe's economy.

He who wants to appraise the immediate future of Europe must realize unequivocally that there are but two possibilities almost equally probable (provided, of course, that he disregards an eventual surrender of Continental Europe to the marching legions of the communistic International). Either Soviet Russia will reduce Continental Europe to a comparatively small area west of the Elbe and the Adriatic Sea, or she will be forced by the united democratic nations to retreat to her boundaries arranged with Germany in 1939. In the first case the whole vast area east of the new frontier will be gradually forced to carry out the blue-print of the communistic New Order and will have to develop as a part of the tremendous Soviet war-economy. The problem of the retarded European regions will thus disappear, because the Soviet Union is able to absorb the whole agricultural produce of Southeastern Europe and to use the entire surplus population of the conquered European countries for developing her armament industries in Western Siberia and Central Asia. On the other hand, the rest of Continental Europe will be in a desperate economic situation which will be still more aggravated if a portion of the population subjugated by the Soviet escapes to Western Europe.

France, of course, will not be seriously hurt by such a development, since she can exist apart by exploiting her immense colonial Empire and by exporting her fancy goods to the rest of the world. Any other European country, however, situated between France and the Soviet Union, will have to starve and to return to savagery unless it is integrated into a new political and economic unit which will be ruled by the United States or is allowed to join the British Commonwealth in order to participate in the mighty British preferential set-up. Especially in the latter case the new Central European federation could concentrate on the production of some highly specialized goods with great labor value and might adjust the structure of its agriculture to the traditional requirements of the British market by producing more dairy-products, vegetables and meat, and less grain.

Should, however, the Soviet Union be pushed back to her confines of 1939, the entire European situation will undergo a radical change. Under such conditions there will be no difficulty at all in reconstructing Central Europe situated between France and Soviet Russia, provided that the area is integrated into a single, large economic unit, and provided that there is no artificial and economically unsound deindustrialization of the densely populated and highly civilized countries in the heart of Continental Europe. Any Central European Confederation of that kind, which should be politically controlled and protected by the United States, Great Britain, and France, will be able to solve any economic problem. For the retarded agricultural countries of Southeastern Europe can find under normal conditions a sufficient outlet for their produce and also for their surplus population within that large regional bloc which constitutes a sort of natural unit. The formation of such a bloc would not mean that Central Europe returns to her previous policy of planned economic self-sufficiency, because—under normal political conditions—she will always have to import a large amount of foreign food and raw materials in exchange for her highly specialized products which she owes to the inherited skills of the people. Nor is there any danger that Germany or any other country absorbed by the Central European bloc will gain the upper-hand; for any unhealthy political development could always be checked by the foreign guarantors of peace.

Dr. Basch shows a meritorious care for the vital problem of Europe's economic integration as well as for a sound reconstruction of world economy. His work may prove to be an effective stimulant to those statesmen and economists who will be courageous enough to make conclusions and to give recommendations in conformity with the data presented by him but to disregard some of the author's conclusions which may be attributed to the obstacles which he encounters by reason of his high diplomatic rank.

St. Louis University

BORIS ISCHBOLDIN.

Years of Victory, by Arthur Bryant. New York. Harper & Brothers. 1945. pp. xii + 468. \$4.00

This widely acclaimed sequel to the author's *Years of Endurance* covers the decade of English history from the Peace of Amiens until Wellington's capture of Ciudad Rodrigo early in 1812. Its main concern, naturally, is the struggle carried on through those years between Napoleon and England. It therefore touches on English domestic affairs and on the Napoleonic

empire only insofar as they relate to the war between France and England. Mr. Bryant divides his book almost equally between the struggle for mastery of the seas, which culminates in the British victory at Trafalgar, and the Peninsular campaign, which he sees fit to end when Wellington secures the gateway to Spain—Cuidad Rodrigo.

Mr. Bryant happily combines industrious scholarship with ability to write readable prose. Without any attempt at "popularizing," the author has produced a work which will sustain the interest of any intelligent reader. He offers to the historian a wealth of detailed information not hitherto collected in any single volume, information which brings the characters to life and clothes them with human reality. But the author never allows his wealth of detail to obscure the large pattern of events he is tracing. Mr. Bryant, in the reviewer's opinion, is at his best in describing the engagements of the Peninsular campaign.

This book, unfortunately, was written in the days when England's long war against Hitler was finally nearing a successful completion. Throughout the work stress is laid on the parallel between England saving the world from Napoleon then and England saving the world from Hitler yesterday. This does not make for history that can stand the test of time. The very reasons for *Years of Victory's* being so widely acclaimed today are reasons why sensible Englishmen in the future will be abashed for having made such a fuss over it.

The weaknesses of the book, resulting from the patriotic heat in which it was written, can be summed up under two headings. In the first place, Mr. Bryant tends to attribute the purest of motives to the English at all times, whereas Napoleon becomes a nineteenth-century Hitler. Of Napoleon, for example, he observes: "His rule in dealing with more than one party was *divide et impera*, that of England loyalty to allies." (p. 186). England ends up pure and white, Napoleon devilish and black; there are no shadings.

The second weakness is rather typical of English historians: Mr. Bryant does not know his continental peoples as well as he should. His attitude is about the same as that of an English private in Moore's army, or that of Wellington himself. Bryant consequently judges the various continental peoples harshly. He cannot see why they did not stand up as steadfastly to Napoleon as did England, and he does not understand why they looked with suspicion on their island allies. Had he made greater use of continental sources, instead of relying almost exclusively on English material, he would have seen both England's allies and England herself in a somewhat different light.

Despite these two weak points, *Years of Victory* is a good book that was needed by English-reading historians and students. It fills in gaps necessarily left in the story by continental historians who view these years of struggle from the vantage point of Paris. Read by itself it gives a wrongly colored picture of these years—the picture seen by the average Englishman safe behind his channel looking puzzled at the Napoleonic scene; read in conjunction with the usual Napoleonic histories, it offers much information that has been too often, and wrongly, ignored.

St. Louis University

THOMAS P. NEILL

Germany Is Our Problem, by Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
New York. Harper and Bros. 1945. pp. xiii + 239.
\$2.00

Pope Pius XII, in his Christmas (1945) allocution to the College of Cardinals, set out the only sound basis for dealing with former enemy peoples. He stated: "One who seeks reparations should base his claim on moral principles, respect for those inviolable rights which remain valid even for those who have surrendered unconditionally to the victor. . . ."

Ex-Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, in this small but very disturbing book under review, appears to ignore the Papal counsels completely in his analysis of the problem of what to do with Germany. His thesis can be stated simply; whatever else it may be, it is completely logical. For Mr. Morgenthau, the German occupies practically the same position which Hitler reserved for the Jew, that is, the root cause of most of the evils in the modern family of nations. Of course, Mr. Morgenthau protests repeatedly that the Hitlerian doctrine of racism is utterly foreign to his own views. Yet he quotes, with evident approval, a statement that while Christianity "somewhat mitigated that brutal German 'gaudium certaminis' or joy of battle, it could not destroy it". Or again, in his own words, "the traditional German will to war goes back as far as our own

traditional will to freedom". If this isn't racism, it at least comes very close.

Starting from such a position, the author comes very directly to his solution. It is not characterized by any great degree of "mitigating sentimentality about the welfare of individuals or the sanctity of life." Since Germans are chronically addicted to war-making, they must be utterly deprived of the means of making war. How can this be done most cheaply and most effectively? Mr. Morgenthau rejects, on the one hand, the destruction of the German people by mass-shooting, gas chambers and the like, as unnecessary. He rejects on the other, the punitive measures of Versailles as ineffective. If Germany is deprived of all heavy industries, now and for an indefinite future, Mr. Morgenthau is convinced, war-making by her people becomes impossible. "Germany's real armament is a triple threat of metallurgical, chemical and electrical industries." Hence Germany must be deindustrialized. Those of her heavy industrial assets which might be useful elsewhere, are to be removed to other parts of Europe; the rest is to be destroyed, and thorough inspection maintained thereafter to prevent rebuilding in Germany. Moreover, Americans should have no part in the maintenance of this inspection control, primarily because the American GI "just hadn't been trained to resist kindness from a motherly woman or a gentle old man or a wistful child." This job is to be left to the French, the British and the Russians; they are apparently more able to resist humane urges.

Meanwhile, what is to become of the German people? That, says the author, is their worry, and not ours. The responsibility of the victorious Allies should be limited to de-industrialization of Germany now, and to prevention of re-industrialization in the future. Beyond that, the Germans must be made to understand that they are on their own. The result, of course, as is pointed out, would be to force those Germans who somehow managed to survive into agriculture; Germany, or rather the several states into which she is to be divided after transfers of some territory to Poland, Russia, Denmark and the UNO, would of necessity become an agricultural state. It is admitted that such a program of forced agriculturalization will work a temporary "hardship" on millions of persons. This is putting it mildly, indeed. The problems of transferring millions of Germans from cities to farms, from industry to agriculture, and of feeding and clothing them in the interim, are admittedly difficult. But the Germans must solve these problems themselves, beginning now, and with no help from others whatever. In time, Mr. Morgenthau argues, and he is undoubtedly correct, what is left of the German people could function successfully as a nation of farmers, helpless to make modern war. But what would be left? Might not shooting and gas-chambers now be more humane than starvation, disease and chaos spread over many years?

This program is not, the author insists, a hate campaign. "The world has seen enough of hatred, and the United Nations have no need to adopt the policy of their enemies." To that sentiment, at least, we can subscribe without reservation. But if the program summarized above represents views based upon the Papal principles enunciated at Christmas-time, it would be truly terrifying to contemplate what might be in store for the Germans were we to permit ourselves to feel even a slight degree of hatred and vengeance.

What to do with Germany remains the first of the big post-war questions which the United Nations must answer. In the reviewer's opinion, an answer based upon Mr. Morgenthau's proposals would be a tragedy of the first order; it would add new problems instead of solving existing ones; and it would eliminate what little chance remains for avoiding World War III. Christian principles remain the only true foundation for world peace; it is high time that the world return to them.

St. Louis University

PAUL G. STEINICKER.

Renaissance Literary Criticism, A Study of Its Social Content, by Vernon Hall, Jr. New York. Columbia University Press. 1945. pp. viii + 260. \$3.00

The purpose of this book is better indicated by the subtitle than by its title. On page one the author is quite explicit about the focal point of his study:

The purpose of this essay is not to review once again all the ideas of the Renaissance critics, but rather to examine that portion of their criticism which was directly affected by the social and political ideas of their age.

In keeping with that purpose the author makes a survey of the important Renaissance critics of Italy, France, and England;

l, with rather ample documentation from their works, shows that many of the most typical ideas in their criticism were the result of their social and political environment rather than of specifically aesthetic norms.

The aristocratic concept of society, which prevailed in all these countries, dictated much of what the critics in these countries said about diction: the best language was that employed by the aristocracy and more specifically by royalty. This was the "King's English," therefore, that was the best English. Mr. Hall shows that this idea of diction was associated, in France and England, with the monarchical ideal of government and with the theory of the divine right of kings. In all these countries aristocratic and not aesthetic norms guided the critics in their ranking of the traditional literary genres. Tragedy, for instance, was considered greater than comedy because it dealt with the doings of kings and queens. Since tragedy, according to the critics, was supposed to deal with the lives of those of high estate, with the old medieval "fall of princes," the critics demanded that the language, costuming, and staging be suited to the exalted rank of the characters. Comedy was supposed to deal with the affairs of the middle class, and satire and farce with those of the lower class; hence they were supposed to be composed in the mean and low styles respectively. The whole theory of literary decorum, the central doctrine of Renaissance criticism, is shown by the author to have been based on the existing aristocratic concept of society.

The dicta of the Renaissance critics concerning the minor poetic genres such as the ode and the lyric, the place and purpose of the poet in society, and the position of the vernacular as a medium of literary expression are all reviewed in turn; and much of what they say in these matters is also shown to be the result of their social and political background. The growing spirit of nationalism, for instance, and the desire to put their native language on an equal footing with the classical languages dictate a great deal of what the French and English critics have to say in defence of the vernacular; while in Italy there, instead of an adolescent nationalism, political disunity prevailed, the discussions by the critics concerning the vernacular are mere squabbles about the merits of the various Italian dialects—squabbles which reflected the incessant wars between Italian city states.

Mr. Hall has not discovered anything new about Renaissance criticism; but he has shown, more clearly than other writers on the subject, how much the typical Renaissance, critical opinions owe to the contemporary aristocratic idea of society and to current political theories and situations in Italy, France, and England. This is the first book published by the author, professor of English at Dartmouth College, and in style and organization it shows some of the less pleasant characteristics that we sometimes associate with Ph. D. theses. Since Mr. Hall's primary concern in the book was with the social and political background of the Renaissance criticism, it is probably unfair to complain that he shows no awareness anywhere in the book of the sharp division between the "grammarians" and the "dialecticians" which formed a very important part of the background of the Renaissance disputes about language and rhyme. In neglecting this side of the background, however, he is no different from all the other writers on Renaissance criticism, with the exception of Etienne Gilson. In this regard Gilson has laid the foundation for a completely new and fresh view of Renaissance criticism which would not be a denial of but a complement to what Mr. Hall says here.

St. Louis University

M. B. McNAMEE, S. J.

Pillars of the Church, by Theodore Maynard. New York. Longmans, Green & Co. 1945. pp. xi + 308. \$3.00

This book might more accurately have been called "People Have Chosen to Write About," because the selection is based much more upon Dr. Maynard's whim than upon objective realities the twelve subjects possess. Thus, popes are omitted for Peter is the Rock," not a pillar. Similarly the apostolic and patristic ages have been completely passed over; nor is there any single representative of any of the great Eastern churches.

Dr. Maynard laid heavy handicaps upon himself, of course, when he limited his choice to twelve pillars. For this reason he is constrained to pass over such giants as Cyril and Methodius, Leon Stylites, Boniface, Wlodimir, Francis of Sales, Thomas Aquinas. He chooses Coventry Patmore, but must exclude Cranham, Windthorst, and Joseph de Maistre. And to have

rejected St. Catherine of Siena, the greatest woman, save one, in all history, is passing strange.

But it is better to comment upon what Dr. Maynard has done.

Uneven though they are, the twelve whom he has selected are all great figures. Beginning with St. Benedict, the author portrays with singular felicity the gentle, moderate character of the saint himself. To have found Benedict and to have portrayed him so strikingly is a singular triumph.

The accounts of St. Patrick and St. Dominic are less concerned with the men than with their achievement. Patrick is significant not only because he converted a people to Christianity, but because he demonstrated the Church's remarkable ability to adapt its manner to each people without deforming revealed truth. "Patrick proved himself one of the greatest of all missionaries not merely because he was a saint but because he understood the Irish. He learned their language. . . . He conformed to Irish social usage. . . . The result was that, while Rome the ancient empire was breaking up, he founded a new empire for Christ on the edge of the world."

Similarly, it is difficult to find the man, Bede, in Dr. Maynard's account. And no wonder, since so little is known of him. St. Louis, St. Thomas More, St. Francis Xavier, and very notably, St. Philip Neri, are quite different. Philip Neri, of course, is all man. Some of the most charming stories—the gold coins, for instance—are missing, but Philip is there smiling, winning.

St. Dominic and St. Vincent de Paul are true pillars. Dominic by his frontal attack on heresy, his ardor for truth, and particularly his apostolic role of preaching truly pillared the Church. So, Vincent many centuries later. He, himself, his Daughters of Charity and the Congregation of the Mission have all been a strong support of the Church.

Coventry Patmore may be a potential pillar, but it might be better to think of that choice as a whim. Bl. Francesca Cabrini, whose apostolic work carried her almost as far as that of Janet Erskine Stuart or Abbot Obrecht, who was a foundress and a saint, besides, is the American representative.

1581 on page 25 should read 581.

St. Louis University

FRANCIS J. CORLEY, S. J.

American History

The Latin American Front, by Joseph F. Privitera. Milwaukee. The Bruce Publishing Company. 1945. pp. 212. \$2.25

This thoughtful little work is in one sense a war casualty. Like too many of its fellows it suffers at times from the unfortunate, but perfectly understandable, delay between composition and publication. Certain of its views and analyses have thereby lost something of their timeliness, but the book as a whole has not lost its inherent value. Many, most in fact, of its chapters have that element of lasting truth which will make them worthwhile at any moment. Aspects of "The Political Front" have changed; time has often worked alterations in conditions as the author describes them in "The Economic Front"; Sumner Welles is no longer in the driver's seat as far as Inter-American policies go, nor is Henry Wallace in his former key position of influence and prestige. What Dr. Privitera had hoped would be a commentary on relatively current events has often become historical observation. But, even so, history is not without its merit or its lesson.

The chapters of the section styled "The Psychological Front" are, in many respects, the best of the book. The analysis of the Latin character and the comparison with the Anglo mind and attitude are regularly stimulating. Views may at times be open to question, but they are always provocative and helpful. The author's wide acquaintance with the literature of Latin America affords him a much sounder basis for his judgments than that used by the average "authority" on Latin America and Latin Americans. He employs this fund of knowledge to advantage in more than one instance. He is also well read in the range of varied Anglo-American opinion regarding southern neighbors, and he is regularly outspoken when he feels that he has good reason (and he generally has) to disagree with the self-appointed "pontiffs." A thoughtful perusal of Dr. Privitera's work would be valuable to anyone interested in the whole Inter-American problem. He has a message which might well be heeded. It is rarely, if ever, too late to correct mistakes. It is always wise to provide against repetition in the future.

In two chapters of "The Political Front," those on Argentina

and Chile, this reviewer wonders if too great reliance on one or other authority or writer may not contribute an element of weakness to Dr. Privitera's views. His comparison of the Argentines with ourselves, however, is a point worth considering. The parallelism, generally recognized in aspects of economic productivity, is too often missed on the psychological level. We can be grateful to the author for highlighting this similarity.

St. Louis University

JOHN F. BANNON, S. J.

Quebec Et L'Eglise Aux Etats Unis Sous Mgr. Briand et Mgr. Plessis, by Laval Laurent, O.F.M., S.T.L. Washington, D. C. The Catholic University of America Press. 1945. pp. xxviii + 258.

This dissertation, presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Theology could very well have been a product of the Department of History and will prove of particular interest to the specialist in the field of early American History. The author here treats of a little known aspect of the relations between Canada and the United States, the understanding of which calls for theological insight in addition to the knowledge of the historian.

The study limits itself to two periods and two Canadian episcopates, that of Mgr. Briand (1766-1786) and that of Mgr. Plessis (1808-1825), treating in both cases of the influence exercised by these prelates on political developments in the United States during these critical periods, and of the missionary work, direct and indirect, which had its source in Canada, together with the problems in ecclesiastical jurisdiction which arose from this intimate relationship. From an admirable abundance of original documents a number of hitherto unknown or misinterpreted facts are brought to light with the objectiveness of the true historian, combined with the understanding of the theologian. A difficult and delicate piece of work has here been accomplished and a genuine contribution made to the knowledge of the periods considered.

Unlike many a doctorate dissertation this study, both in style and treatment, commands the interest of the reader. In his search for the truth the author displays a laudable spirit of independence as regards the judgments of previous writers from whom he does not hesitate to differ whenever his analysis of

documents indicates an error in interpretation. Nevertheless he guards against hasty conclusions and time and again candidly admits that the sources offer no satisfactory answer to the problem proposed. The spirit of honest, unprejudiced consideration of facts is throughout evident. The array of sources consulted is quite imposing; footnotes, though frequent, are not such as to become burdensome to the reader or interfere with the continuity of the discussion; two indexes, one of persons and one of places, serve greatly to make the study a valuable source of reference.

This work will be most useful to the American historian and the historian of theology alike, and those who become acquainted with it will no doubt look for other contributions from the author. Unhappily, the hope is vain, for this publication is posthumous one. Even before he had put the finishing touches on his dissertation this promising young scholar was the victim of accidental drowning while serving as chaplain at the camp of Notre-Dame-of-Montreal. The loss to his Order and to Scholarship is great indeed.

St. Louis University

CHRISTIAN L. BONNET, S. J.

Inter-American Affairs, 1944, edited by Arthur P. Whitaker. New York. Columbia University Press. 1945. pp. 284. \$3.25

Continuing the series of annual surveys begun three years ago this volume measures up to the high standards set by its predecessors. It follows the same general pattern of the three previous volumes but offers one significant and very helpful addition. This is the essay on "Main Currents of Economic Thought" by Sanford A. Mosk. As usual the developments of the past year in politics and diplomacy, in cultural relations in labor and social welfare, and in various aspects of the economic life of the American nations are described and evaluated. There is the regularly anticipated inclusion of Canadian affairs. There are several very useful additions in the appendices, not the least of which is the listing of the "Bilateral Commercial Treaties and Agreements Negotiated by the Latin American Republics in 1944." And not to be overlooked is the editor's usual thoughtful and stimulating chapter, "Summary and Retrospect."

J. F. B.

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